On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 5:29 AM Mickaël Salaün <mickael.sal...@ssi.gouv.fr> wrote: > > > On 03/01/2019 12:17, Jann Horn wrote: > > On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 3:49 PM Mickaël Salaün > > <mickael.sal...@ssi.gouv.fr> wrote: > >> On 12/12/2018 18:09, Jann Horn wrote: > >>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 9:18 AM Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net> wrote: > >>>> Enable to either propagate the mount options from the underlying VFS > >>>> mount to prevent execution, or to propagate the file execute permission. > >>>> This may allow a script interpreter to check execution permissions > >>>> before reading commands from a file. > >>>> > >>>> The main goal is to be able to protect the kernel by restricting > >>>> arbitrary syscalls that an attacker could perform with a crafted binary > >>>> or certain script languages. It also improves multilevel isolation > >>>> by reducing the ability of an attacker to use side channels with > >>>> specific code. These restrictions can natively be enforced for ELF > >>>> binaries (with the noexec mount option) but require this kernel > >>>> extension to properly handle scripts (e.g., Python, Perl).
I like this idea, but I think it shouldn't live in Yama (since it is currently intended to be a ptrace-policy-only LSM). It was _originally_ designed to do various DAC improvements, but the agreement was that those should live directly in the VFS instead (i.e. the symlink, hardlink and now fifo and regular file defenses). This should likely go in similarly. (But if not, it could also be its own LSM.) -- Kees Cook
