Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a
TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even a TPM is not found to
avoid module dependency problems.However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is inactive or deactivated. This patch ignores tpm_get_random() errors in init_digests() and returns -EFAULT in pcrlock() if the TPM didn't return random data. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> --- security/keys/trusted.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 9a94672e7adc..34f04ffcf2e5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + /* This happens if the TPM didn't return random data */ + if (!digests) + return -EFAULT; + return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0; } @@ -1233,10 +1237,8 @@ static int __init init_digests(void) int i; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; + if (ret < 0 || ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) + return 0; digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.17.1
