On Fri, 2020-06-26 at 17:38 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote: > This series ultimately extends the supported IMA rule conditionals for > the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function. As of today, there's an imbalance in > IMA language conditional support for KEXEC_CMDLINE rules in comparison > to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK rules. The KEXEC_CMDLINE > rules do not support *any* conditionals so you cannot have a sequence of > rules like this: > > dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t > dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t > dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t > measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK > measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK > measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE > > Instead, KEXEC_CMDLINE rules can only be measured or not measured and > there's no additional flexibility in today's implementation of the > KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function. > > With this series, the above sequence of rules becomes valid and any > calls to kexec_file_load() with a kernel and initramfs inode type of > foo_t will not be measured (that includes the kernel cmdline buffer) > while all other objects given to a kexec_file_load() syscall will be > measured. There's obviously not an inode directly associated with the > kernel cmdline buffer but this patch series ties the inode based > decision making for KEXEC_CMDLINE to the kernel's inode. I think this > will be intuitive to policy authors. > > While reading IMA code and preparing to make this change, I realized > that the buffer based hook functions (KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK) are > quite special in comparison to longer standing hook functions. These > buffer based hook functions can only support measure actions and there > are some restrictions on the conditionals that they support. However, > the rule parser isn't enforcing any of those restrictions and IMA policy > authors wouldn't have any immediate way of knowing that the policy that > they wrote is invalid. For example, the sequence of rules above parses > successfully in today's kernel but the > "dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE ..." rule is incorrectly handled in > ima_match_rules(). The dont_measure rule is *always* considered to be a > match so, surprisingly, no KEXEC_CMDLINE measurements are made. > > While making the rule parser more strict, I realized that the parser > does not correctly free all of the allocated memory associated with an > ima_rule_entry when going down some error paths. Invalid policy loaded > by the policy administrator could result in small memory leaks. > > I envision patches 1-6 going to stable. The series is ordered in a way > that has all the fixes up front, followed by cleanups, followed by the > feature patch. The breakdown of patches looks like so: > > Memory leak fixes: 1-3 > Parser strictness fixes: 4-6 > Code cleanups made possible by the fixes: 7-10 > Extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support: 11 > > Perhaps the most logical ordering for code review is: > > 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11 > > If you'd like me to re-order or split up the series, just let me know. > Thanks for considering these patches! > > * Series-wide v2 changes > - Rebased onto next-integrity-testing > - Squashed patches 2 and 3 from v1 > + Updated this cover letter to account for changes to patch index > changes > + See patch 2 for specific code changes
Other than the comment on 9/11 the patch set looks good. thanks! Mimi
