On Wed, Apr 01, 2020 at 02:39:03PM -0700, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> This change gives userfaultfd file descriptors a real security
> context, allowing policy to act on them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/userfaultfd.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> index 37df7c9eedb1..78ff5d898733 100644
> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ struct userfaultfd_ctx {
> bool mmap_changing;
> /* mm with one ore more vmas attached to this userfaultfd_ctx */
> struct mm_struct *mm;
> + /* The inode that owns this context --- not a strong reference. */
> + const struct inode *owner;
> };
Adding this field seems wrong. There's no reference held to it, so it can only
be used if the caller holds a reference to the inode anyway. The only user of
this field is via userfafultfd_read(), so why not just use the inode of the
struct file passed to userfaultfd_read()?
> SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> {
> + struct file *file;
> struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
> int fd;
>
> @@ -1974,8 +1979,25 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> /* prevent the mm struct to be freed */
> mmgrab(ctx->mm);
>
> - fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
> - O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS));
> + file = anon_inode_getfile_secure(
> + "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
> + O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS),
> + NULL);
> + if (IS_ERR(file)) {
> + fd = PTR_ERR(file);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (fd < 0) {
> + fput(file);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ctx->owner = file_inode(file);
> + fd_install(fd, file);
> +
> +out:
> if (fd < 0) {
> mmdrop(ctx->mm);
> kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
What's the point of anon_inode_getfile_secure()? anon_inode_getfd_secure()
would work here too.
- Eric
