On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 11:11 AM Mika Westerberg
<mika.westerb...@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 10:38:24AM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 8:57 AM Mika Westerberg
> > <mika.westerb...@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> > > Actually thinking about this bit more, to make PCI and the platform
> > > parts consistent we can make the "writeable" control this for the PCI
> > > part as well. So what if we add a callback to struct intel_spi_boardinfo
> > > that the PCI driver populates and then the "core" driver uses to enable
> > > writing when "writeable" is set to 1.
> >
> > If you are really worried about the write protection being bypassed by
> > a different driver or code injection, the best way would seem to be to
> > only enable writing in the mtd write callback and disable it immediately
> > after the write is complete. I still don't see why this hardware would
> > be more susceptible to this kind of attack than other drivers though,
> > as it already has the safeguard against writing through the MTD layer
> > without the module parameter.
>
> Hmm, is there already a mechanism at the MTD level to prevent writes? If
> that's the case then sure we can use that instead.
The mtd core just checks both the permissions on the device node (which
default to 0600 without any special udev rules) and the MTD_WRITEABLE
on the underlying device that is controlled by the module parameter
in case of intel-spi{,-platform,-pci}.c.
Arnd
