On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 07:44:19AM -0500, YiFei Zhu wrote:
> From: YiFei Zhu <yifei...@illinois.edu>
>
> The fast (common) path for seccomp should be that the filter permits
> the syscall to pass through, and failing seccomp is expected to be
> an exceptional case; it is not expected for userspace to call a
> denylisted syscall over and over.
>
> This first finds the current allow bitmask by iterating through
> syscall_arches[] array and comparing it to the one in struct
> seccomp_data; this loop is expected to be unrolled. It then
> does a test_bit against the bitmask. If the bit is set, then
> there is no need to run the full filter; it returns
> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW immediately.
>
> Co-developed-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskar...@cs.cmu.edu>
> Signed-off-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskar...@cs.cmu.edu>
> Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifei...@illinois.edu>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 20d33378a092..ac0266b6d18a 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -167,6 +167,12 @@ static inline void seccomp_cache_inherit(struct
> seccomp_filter *sfilter,
> const struct seccomp_filter *prev)
> {
> }
> +
> +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
> + const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_NR_ONLY */
>
> /**
> @@ -321,6 +327,34 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter
> *filter, unsigned int flen)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_NR_ONLY
> +/**
> + * seccomp_cache_check - lookup seccomp cache
> + * @sfilter: The seccomp filter
> + * @sd: The seccomp data to lookup the cache with
> + *
> + * Returns true if the seccomp_data is cached and allowed.
> + */
> +static bool seccomp_cache_check(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
> + const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +{
> + int syscall_nr = sd->nr;
> + int arch;
> +
> + if (unlikely(syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls))
> + return false;
This protects us from x32 (i.e. syscall_nr will have 0x40000000 bit
set), but given the effort needed to support compat, I think supporting
x32 isn't much more. (Though again, I note that NR_syscalls differs in
size, so this test needs to be per-arch and obviously after
arch-discovery.)
That said, if it really does turn out that x32 is literally the only
architecture doing these shenanigans (and I suspect not, given the MIPS
case), okay, fine, I'll give in. :) You and Jann both seem to think this
isn't worth it.
> +
> + for (arch = 0; arch < ARRAY_SIZE(syscall_arches); arch++) {
> + if (likely(syscall_arches[arch] == sd->arch))
I think this linear search for the matching arch can be made O(1) (this
is what I was trying to do in v1: we can map all possible combos to a
distinct bitmap, so there is just math and lookup rather than a linear
compare search. In the one-arch case, it can also be easily collapsed
into a no-op (though my v1 didn't do this correctly).
> + return test_bit(syscall_nr,
> + sfilter->cache.syscall_ok[arch]);
> + }
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_NR_ONLY */
> +
> /**
> * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
> * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
> @@ -343,6 +377,9 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data
> *sd,
> if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
> return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;
>
> + if (seccomp_cache_check(f, sd))
> + return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> +
> /*
> * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
> * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
> --
> 2.28.0
>
--
Kees Cook
