From: YiFei Zhu <yifei...@illinois.edu> Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls.
This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be in the format of: <arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER> where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: x86_64 0 ALLOW x86_64 1 ALLOW x86_64 2 ALLOW x86_64 3 ALLOW [...] x86_64 132 ALLOW x86_64 133 ALLOW x86_64 134 FILTER x86_64 135 FILTER x86_64 136 FILTER x86_64 137 ALLOW x86_64 138 ALLOW x86_64 139 FILTER x86_64 140 ALLOW x86_64 141 ALLOW [...] This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <ja...@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fgrf_twyucg7pbkaetvbbop...@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifei...@illinois.edu> --- arch/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h | 3 ++ fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++ include/linux/seccomp.h | 5 +++ kernel/seccomp.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 98 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 21a3675a7a3a..85239a974f04 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -471,6 +471,15 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER results in the system call being skipped immediately. - seccomp syscall wired up +config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_CACHE + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things: + - all the requirements for HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + - SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE + - SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR + - SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME + config SECCOMP prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode" def_bool y @@ -498,6 +507,21 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details. +config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache" + depends on SECCOMP + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER + depends on PROC_FS + help + This is enables /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor + seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading + the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + + This option is for debugging only. Enabling present the risk that + an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic. + + If unsure, say N. + config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK bool help diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 1ab22869a765..1a807f89ac77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES if MMU && COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_CACHE select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h index 03365af6165d..cd57c3eabab5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -19,13 +19,16 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 # define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 # define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "x86_64" # ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT # define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT AUDIT_ARCH_I386 # define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR IA32_NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME "ia32" # endif #else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ # define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_I386 # define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "ia32" #endif #include <asm-generic/seccomp.h> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 617db4e0faa0..a4990410ff05 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3258,6 +3258,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3587,6 +3590,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif }; static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index 02aef2844c38..1f028d55142a 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -121,4 +121,9 @@ static inline long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task, return -EINVAL; } #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); +#endif #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 51032b41fe59..a75746d259a5 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -548,6 +548,9 @@ void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; + /* We are effectively holding the siglock by not having any sighand. */ + WARN_ON(tsk->sighand != NULL); + /* Detach task from its filter tree. */ tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL; __seccomp_filter_release(orig); @@ -2308,3 +2311,59 @@ static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void) device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init) #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG +/* Currently CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG implies SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ +static void proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(struct seq_file *m, const char *name, + const void *bitmap, size_t bitmap_size) +{ + int nr; + + for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) { + bool cached = test_bit(nr, bitmap); + char *status = cached ? "ALLOW" : "FILTER"; + + seq_printf(m, "%s %d %s\n", name, nr, status); + } +} + +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *f; + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * We don't want some sandboxed process know what their seccomp + * filters consist of. + */ + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + + if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) + return 0; + + f = READ_ONCE(task->seccomp.filter); + if (!f) { + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + return 0; + } + + /* prevent filter from being freed while we are printing it */ + __get_seccomp_filter(f); + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + + proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME, + f->cache.allow_native, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR); + +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT + proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME, + f->cache.allow_compat, + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR); +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */ + + __put_seccomp_filter(f); + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG */ -- 2.28.0
