On 11/28/2007 12:41 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
> ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.24-rc3/2.6.24-rc3-mm2/
[...]
> +capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch
A regression against -mm1. This patch breaks bind (9.5.0-18.a7.fc8):
capset(0x19980330, 0,
{CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
0}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
$ grep SEC .config
CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
# CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m
# CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3 is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set
probably this hunk?:
@@ -133,6 +119,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
}
+ if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+ cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
+ current->cap_bset))) {
+ /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
regards,
--
Jiri Slaby ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University
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