Quoting Casey Schaufler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > > --- Jiri Slaby <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On 11/28/2007 12:41 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: > > > > > > ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.24-rc3/2.6.24-rc3-mm2/ > > [...] > > > +capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch > > > > A regression against -mm1. This patch breaks bind (9.5.0-18.a7.fc8): > > capset(0x19980330, 0, > > > {CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, > > > CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, > > 0}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) > > > > $ grep SEC .config > > CONFIG_SECCOMP=y > > # CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK is not set > > CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m > > # CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3 is not set > > # CONFIG_SECURITY is not set > > # CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set > > > > probably this hunk?: > > @@ -133,6 +119,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct > > /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ > > return -EPERM; > > } > > + if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable, > > + cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable, > > + current->cap_bset))) { > > + /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ > > + return -EPERM; > > + }
That shouldn't be it, since you can't lower cap_bset since CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n. > > > > /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ > > if (!cap_issubset (*permitted, > > I can see that the value for CAP_LAST_CAP is not right in > include/linux/capability.h, but I don't know if that is the Alas, that doesn't seem likely to be it either, since cap_valid() and therefore CAP_LAST_CAP are only used when tweaking the cap_bset. > only problem. I should have a patch (unless someone beats me to it) > later today. Oh, sorry, after I sent the patch to fix that inline, I never sent it as a separate patch. I'll resend it to lkml right now. thanks, -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/