On 12.11.20 15:40, Joel Fernandes wrote:
On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 08:40:05AM -0500, Joel Fernandes wrote:
On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 11:29:37PM +0100, Alexander Graf wrote:
On 11.11.20 23:15, Joel Fernandes wrote:
On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 5:13 PM Joel Fernandes <j...@joelfernandes.org> wrote:
On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 5:00 PM Alexander Graf <g...@amazon.com> wrote:
On 11.11.20 22:14, Joel Fernandes wrote:
Some hardware such as certain AMD variants don't have cross-HT MDS/L1TF
issues. Detect this and don't enable core scheduling as it can
needlessly slow the device done.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index dece79e4d1e9..0e6e61e49b23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -152,6 +152,14 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
#endif
}
+/*
+ * Do not need core scheduling if CPU does not have MDS/L1TF vulnerability.
+ */
+int arch_allow_core_sched(void)
+{
+ return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
Can we make this more generic and user settable, similar to the L1 cache
flushing modes in KVM?
I am not 100% convinced that there are no other thread sibling attacks
possible without MDS and L1TF. If I'm paranoid, I want to still be able
to force enable core scheduling.
In addition, we are also using core scheduling as a poor man's mechanism
to give customers consistent performance for virtual machine thread
siblings. This is important irrespective of CPU bugs. In such a
scenario, I want to force enable core scheduling.
Ok, I can make it new kernel command line option with:
coresched=on
coresched=secure (only if HW has MDS/L1TF)
coresched=off
Also, I would keep "secure" as the default. (And probably, we should
modify the informational messages in sysfs to reflect this..)
I agree that "secure" should be the default.
Ok.
Something like so then:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index dece79e4d1e9..3c2457d47f54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -152,6 +152,21 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
#endif
}
+/*
+ * When coresched=secure, do not need coresched if CPU does not have MDS/L1TF
bugs.
+ */
+int arch_allow_core_sched(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * x86: Disallow coresched if it is in secure mode and the CPU does not
+ * have vulnerabilities.
+ */
+ if (coresched_cmd_secure())
+ return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) ||
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
+ else
+ return true;
+}
+
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool
setguest)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index d6428aaf67e7..1be5cf85a4a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -228,4 +228,7 @@ static inline int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control
ctrlval) { return 0;
extern bool cpu_mitigations_off(void);
extern bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void);
+extern bool coresched_cmd_off(void);
+extern bool coresched_cmd_secure(void);
+
#endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 6ff2578ecf17..674edf534cc5 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2552,3 +2552,46 @@ bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt);
+
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "coresched=" cmdline option for controlling
+ * core scheduling. Note that core sched may be needed for usecases other
+ * than security as well.
+ */
+enum coresched_cmds {
+ CORE_SCHED_OFF,
+ CORE_SCHED_SECURE,
+ CORE_SCHED_ON,
+};
+
+static enum coresched_cmds coresched_cmd __ro_after_init = CORE_SCHED_SECURE;
+
+static int __init coresched_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+ coresched_cmd = CORE_SCHED_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+ coresched_cmd = CORE_SCHED_ON;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "secure"))
+ coresched_cmd = CORE_SCHED_SECURE;
+ else
+ pr_crit("Unsupported coresched=%s, defaulting to secure.\n",
+ arg);
+
+ return 0;
Instead of calling the matching function over and over again, can we
just configure a static branch (see below) based on the command line
setting here? Or do we not know about the bugs yet?
+}
+early_param("coresched", coresched_parse_cmdline);
+
+/* coresched=off */
+bool coresched_cmd_off(void)
+{
+ return coresched_cmd == CORE_SCHED_OFF;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(coresched_cmd_off);
+
+/* coresched=secure */
+bool coresched_cmd_secure(void)
+{
+ return coresched_cmd == CORE_SCHED_SECURE;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(coresched_cmd_secure);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 5ed26b469ed6..6f586d221ddb 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -333,8 +333,23 @@ static void __sched_core_disable(void)
printk("core sched disabled\n");
}
+static bool __coresched_supported(void)
+{
+ /* coreched=off command line option. */
+ if (coresched_cmd_off())
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Some arch may not need coresched, example some x86 may not need
+ * coresched if coresched=secure option is passed (=secure is default).
+ */
+ return arch_allow_core_sched();
+}
+
void sched_core_get(void)
{
+ if (!__coresched_supported())
+ return;
I would expect core scheduling to be basically an option that you set
once and never flip. This sounds like a prefect use case for a static
branch to me?
Alex
mutex_lock(&sched_core_mutex);
if (!sched_core_count++)
__sched_core_enable();
@@ -343,6 +358,8 @@ void sched_core_get(void)
void sched_core_put(void)
{
+ if (!__coresched_supported())
+ return;
mutex_lock(&sched_core_mutex);
if (!--sched_core_count)
__sched_core_disable();
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index ada56d8ce56f..20d2aa53336e 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -1206,6 +1206,11 @@ int cpu_core_tag_color_write_u64(struct
cgroup_subsys_state *css,
bool cfs_prio_less(struct task_struct *a, struct task_struct *b, bool fi);
+int __weak arch_allow_core_sched(void)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
#else /* !CONFIG_SCHED_CORE */
static inline bool sched_core_enqueued(struct task_struct *task) { return
false; }
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