On 2/10/21 6:18 AM, Timur Tabi wrote:
> If the make-printk-non-secret command line parameter is set, then
> printk("%p") will print pointers as unhashed.  This is useful for
> debugging purposes.
> 
> A large warning message is displayed if this option is enabled.
> Unhashed pointers, while useful for debugging, expose kernel
> addresses which can be a security risk.
> 
> Also update test_printf to skip the hashed pointer tests if the
> command-line option is set.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Timur Tabi <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>

Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>

Thanks!

> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 15 ++++++++
>  lib/test_printf.c                             |  8 ++++
>  lib/vsprintf.c                                | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt 
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index a10b545c2070..6962379469e4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2613,6 +2613,21 @@
>                       different yeeloong laptops.
>                       Example: machtype=lemote-yeeloong-2f-7inch
>  
> +        make-printk-non-secret
> +                     Force pointers printed to the console to be unhashed.
> +                     By default, when a pointer is printed to the kernel
> +                     console (via %p format string), that pointer is
> +                     "hashed", i.e. obscured by hashing the pointer value.
> +                     This is a security feature that hides actual kernel
> +                     addresses from unprivileged users, but it also makes
> +                     debugging the kernel more difficult since unequal
> +                     pointers can no longer be compared.  If this option is
> +                     specified, then all normal pointers will have their
> +                     true value printed.  Pointers printed via %pK may
> +                     still be hashed.  This option should only be specified
> +                     when debugging the kernel.  Please do not use on
> +                     production kernels.
> +
>       max_addr=nn[KMG]        [KNL,BOOT,ia64] All physical memory greater
>                       than or equal to this physical address is ignored.
>  
> diff --git a/lib/test_printf.c b/lib/test_printf.c
> index ad2bcfa8caa1..b0b62d76e598 100644
> --- a/lib/test_printf.c
> +++ b/lib/test_printf.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ KSTM_MODULE_GLOBALS();
>  static char *test_buffer __initdata;
>  static char *alloced_buffer __initdata;
>  
> +extern bool debug_never_hash_pointers;
> +
>  static int __printf(4, 0) __init
>  do_test(int bufsize, const char *expect, int elen,
>       const char *fmt, va_list ap)
> @@ -301,6 +303,12 @@ plain(void)
>  {
>       int err;
>  
> +     if (debug_never_hash_pointers) {
> +             pr_warn("skipping plain 'p' tests");
> +             skipped_tests += 2;
> +             return;
> +     }
> +
>       err = plain_hash();
>       if (err) {
>               pr_warn("plain 'p' does not appear to be hashed\n");
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 3b53c73580c5..1296d9b0b328 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -2090,6 +2090,34 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct 
> fwnode_handle *fwnode,
>       return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
>  }
>  
> +/* Disable pointer hashing if requested */
> +bool debug_never_hash_pointers __ro_after_init;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debug_never_hash_pointers);
> +
> +static int __init debug_never_hash_pointers_enable(char *str)
> +{
> +     debug_never_hash_pointers = true;
> +
> +     pr_warn("**********************************************************\n");
> +     pr_warn("**   NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE   **\n");
> +     pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** All pointers that are printed to the console will    **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** be printed as unhashed.                              **\n");
> +     pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which may       **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** reduce the security of your system.                  **\n");
> +     pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** If you see this message and you are not debugging    **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** the kernel, report this immediately to your system   **\n");
> +     pr_warn("** administrator!                                       **\n");
> +     pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +     pr_warn("**   NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE   **\n");
> +     pr_warn("**********************************************************\n");
> +
> +     return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("make-printk-non-secret", debug_never_hash_pointers_enable);
> +
>  /*
>   * Show a '%p' thing.  A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
>   * by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
> @@ -2297,8 +2325,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, 
> void *ptr,
>               }
>       }
>  
> -     /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
> -     return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
> +     /*
> +      * default is to _not_ leak addresses, so hash before printing unless
> +      * make-printk-non-secret is specified on the command line.
> +      */
> +     if (unlikely(debug_never_hash_pointers))
> +             return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
> +     else
> +             return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> 

Reply via email to