On 2021/03/23 21:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Please take a look at the newer version of this patch. Do you want to
> add any tags?
Oh, I didn't know that you already posted the newer version.
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index 1d20003243c3..0ba01847e836 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -98,6 +98,14 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct
> inode *inode)
> struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
>
> + /*
> + * The integrity's "iint_cache" is initialized at security_init(),
> + * unless it is not included in the ordered list of LSMs enabled
> + * on the boot command line.
> + */
> + if (!iint_cache)
> + panic("%s: lsm=integrity required.\n", __func__);
> +
This looks strange. If "lsm=" parameter must include "integrity",
it implies that nobody is allowed to disable "integrity" at boot.
Then, why not unconditionally call integrity_iintcache_init() by
not counting on DEFINE_LSM(integrity) declaration?
> iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
> if (iint)
> return iint;
>
