From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Add the following:
/proc/sys/fs/types/${FS_TYPE}/usermount_safe
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Index: linux/fs/filesystems.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/filesystems.c 2008-02-04 23:47:46.000000000 +0100
+++ linux/fs/filesystems.c 2008-02-04 23:48:04.000000000 +0100
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/*
@@ -51,6 +52,57 @@ static struct file_system_type **find_fi
return p;
}
+#define MAX_FILESYSTEM_VARS 1
+
+struct filesystem_sysctl_table {
+ struct ctl_table_header *header;
+ struct ctl_table table[MAX_FILESYSTEM_VARS + 1];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Create /sys/fs/types/${FSNAME} directory with per fs-type tunables.
+ */
+static int filesystem_sysctl_register(struct file_system_type *fs)
+{
+ struct filesystem_sysctl_table *t;
+ struct ctl_path path[] = {
+ { .procname = "fs", .ctl_name = CTL_FS },
+ { .procname = "types", .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED },
+ { .procname = fs->name, .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED },
+ { }
+ };
+
+ t = kzalloc(sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!t)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+
+ t->table[0].ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED;
+ t->table[0].procname = "usermount_safe";
+ t->table[0].maxlen = sizeof(int);
+ t->table[0].data = &fs->fs_safe;
+ t->table[0].mode = 0644;
+ t->table[0].proc_handler = &proc_dointvec;
+
+ t->header = register_sysctl_paths(path, t->table);
+ if (!t->header) {
+ kfree(t);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ fs->sysctl_table = t;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void filesystem_sysctl_unregister(struct file_system_type *fs)
+{
+ struct filesystem_sysctl_table *t = fs->sysctl_table;
+
+ unregister_sysctl_table(t->header);
+ kfree(t);
+}
+
/**
* register_filesystem - register a new filesystem
* @fs: the file system structure
@@ -80,6 +132,13 @@ int register_filesystem(struct file_syst
else
*p = fs;
write_unlock(&file_systems_lock);
+
+ if (res == 0) {
+ res = filesystem_sysctl_register(fs);
+ if (res != 0)
+ unregister_filesystem(fs);
+ }
+
return res;
}
@@ -108,6 +167,7 @@ int unregister_filesystem(struct file_sy
*tmp = fs->next;
fs->next = NULL;
write_unlock(&file_systems_lock);
+ filesystem_sysctl_unregister(fs);
return 0;
}
tmp = &(*tmp)->next;
Index: linux/include/linux/fs.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/fs.h 2008-02-04 23:48:02.000000000 +0100
+++ linux/include/linux/fs.h 2008-02-04 23:48:04.000000000 +0100
@@ -1444,6 +1444,7 @@ struct file_system_type {
struct module *owner;
struct file_system_type * next;
struct list_head fs_supers;
+ struct filesystem_sysctl_table *sysctl_table;
struct lock_class_key s_lock_key;
struct lock_class_key s_umount_key;
Index: linux/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt 2008-02-04
23:47:58.000000000 +0100
+++ linux/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt 2008-02-04 23:48:04.000000000
+0100
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Table of Contents
2.14 /proc/<pid>/io - Display the IO accounting fields
2.15 /proc/<pid>/coredump_filter - Core dump filtering settings
2.16 /proc/<pid>/mountinfo - Information about mounts
+ 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/types - File system type specific parameters
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preface
@@ -2392,4 +2393,34 @@ For more information see:
Documentation/filesystems/sharedsubtree.txt
+2.17 /proc/sys/fs/types/ - File system type specific parameters
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+There's a separate directory /proc/sys/fs/types/<type>/ for each
+filesystem type, containing the following files:
+
+usermount_safe
+--------------
+
+Setting this to non-zero will allow filesystems of this type to be
+mounted by unprivileged users (note, that there are other
+prerequisites as well).
+
+Fuse has been designed to be as safe as possible, and some
+distributions already ship with unprivileged fuse mounts enabled by
+default. There are still some situations (multi-user systems with
+untrusted users in particular), where enabling this for fuse might not
+be appropriate. For more details, see Documentation/filesystems/fuse.txt
+
+Procfs is also safe, but unprivileged mounting of it is not usually
+necessary (bind mounting is equivalent).
+
+Most other filesystems are unsafe. Here are just some of the issues,
+that must be resolved before a filesystem can be declared safe:
+
+ - no strict input checking (buffer overruns, directory loops, etc)
+ - network filesystem deadlocks when mounting from localhost
+ - no permission checking when opening the device
+ - changing mount options when mounting a new instance of a filesystem
+
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
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