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Issue Regarding BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT Programs Bypassing Validation Logic:

__attribute__ ((noinline)) int B()
{
        return 0; /* Valid return value */
}

SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
int A()
{
        return B();
}

SEC("freplace/B")
int replace()
{
        return 1; /* Invalid return value */
}

This method can verify whether the return value of freplace is legitimate
by using env->prog->aux->dst_prog->aux->attach_btf_id.

However, this approach will reject legitimate programs if the return value of
the original program does not come from the replaced function (as shown below).

__attribute__ ((noinline)) int B()
{
        return 0; 
}

SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
int A()
{
        B();
        return 0;
}

SEC("freplace/B")
int replace()
{
        return 1;
}

I have not found a proper solution to this issue.



target.bpf.c:
__attribute__ ((noinline)) int B()
{
        bpf_printk("--\n");
        return -2;      
}

SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
int A()
{
        int i = B();
        bpf_printk("return: %d\n", i);
        return i;
}

freplace.bpf.c:
SEC("freplace/B")
int replace()
{
        bpf_printk("freplace\n");
        return -1;
}
In addition, the log output from testing the above program is as follows:
cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_pipe 
          attack-5370    [002] ...11  4379.086626: bpf_trace_printk: freplace

          attack-5370    [002] ...11  4379.086656: bpf_trace_printk: return: -2

Strangely, the replacement program is executed, but the return value still 
originates from the original program.



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