On Fri, May 22, 2026 at 01:46:37PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: > The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, > keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, > policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the > accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure. > > Define a trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields > there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's > private. > > No functional change intended. > > Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> > ---
I'm supporting this change yes but before spreading tpm_buf all over the place I'd like to get this merged: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/T/#u It'd need tested-by's most importantly. There's another patch shoe-horning buffers a bit upgrading tpm_buf so I thought now would be good tiem to get this finally applied. Possible merge conflicts for +1 change of this should be fairly trivial. BR, Jarkko > This patch depends on 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a > feature"), which is in linux-tpmdd/master but not yet in mainline. > > Please apply on top of linux-tpmdd/master. > > base-commit: 67657fb65aa9f2d7dd46235246b1677792bd103e > > Changelog: > v3: > - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed > in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature") > > v2: > - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7 > - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private > - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean > up patch) > - Address other minor comments from Jarkko > > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- > include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 95 ++++++++++++++--------- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 51 ++++++------ > 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { > > struct trusted_key_options { > uint16_t keytype; > - uint32_t keyhandle; > - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > - uint32_t blobauth_len; > - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > - int pcrlock; > - uint32_t hash; > - uint32_t policydigest_len; > - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > - uint32_t policyhandle; > void *private; > }; > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@ > > extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; > > +struct trusted_tpm_options { > + uint32_t keyhandle; > + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t blobauth_len; > + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > + int pcrlock; > + uint32_t hash; > + uint32_t policydigest_len; > + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t policyhandle; > +}; > + > int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options); > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > index 13513819991e..21360a41d290 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > @@ -49,15 +49,17 @@ enum { > #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; > + > if (!trusted_debug) > return; > > pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); > - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); > - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); > - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); > + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle); > + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock); > + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len); > print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); > + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0); > } > > static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) > @@ -631,6 +633,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, > static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; > struct tpm_buf tb; > int ret; > > @@ -641,9 +644,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ > p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; > > - ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, > + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, > p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, > - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); > + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, > + private->pcrinfo_len); > if (ret < 0) > pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > @@ -657,6 +661,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; > struct tpm_buf tb; > int ret; > > @@ -664,8 +669,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > if (ret) > return ret; > > - ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, > - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); > + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, > + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); > if (ret < 0) > pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > else > @@ -702,6 +707,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { > static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > struct trusted_key_options *opt) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private; > substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; > char *p = c; > int token; > @@ -717,7 +723,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload > *pay, > if (tpm2 < 0) > return tpm2; > > - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > if (!c) > return 0; > @@ -731,11 +737,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > switch (token) { > case Opt_pcrinfo: > - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > return -EINVAL; > - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, > - opt->pcrinfo_len); > + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from, > + private->pcrinfo_len); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > break; > @@ -744,12 +750,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > trusted_key_payload *pay, > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; > - opt->keyhandle = handle; > + private->keyhandle = handle; > break; > case Opt_keyauth: > if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > return -EINVAL; > - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, > + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from, > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -760,21 +766,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > trusted_key_payload *pay, > * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple > * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) > */ > - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); > + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); > > - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from, > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > > - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > break; > } > > - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) > { > - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > - opt->blobauth_len); > + if (tpm2 && > + private->blobauth_len <= > + sizeof(private->blobauth)) { > + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from, > + private->blobauth_len); > break; > } > > @@ -792,14 +800,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > trusted_key_payload *pay, > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > - opt->pcrlock = lock; > + private->pcrlock = lock; > break; > case Opt_hash: > if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) > return -EINVAL; > for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > - opt->hash = i; > + private->hash = i; > break; > } > } > @@ -811,14 +819,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > trusted_key_payload *pay, > } > break; > case Opt_policydigest: > - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; > + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash]; > if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) > return -EINVAL; > - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, > + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from, > digest_len); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; > + private->policydigest_len = digest_len; > break; > case Opt_policyhandle: > if (!tpm2) > @@ -826,7 +834,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload > *pay, > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > - opt->policyhandle = handle; > + private->policyhandle = handle; > break; > default: > return -EINVAL; > @@ -837,6 +845,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload > *pay, > > static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private; > struct trusted_key_options *options; > int tpm2; > > @@ -849,14 +858,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options > *trusted_options_alloc(void) > /* set any non-zero defaults */ > options->keytype = SRK_keytype; > > - if (!tpm2) > - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > + private = kzalloc_obj(*private); > + if (!private) { > + kfree_sensitive(options); > + options = NULL; > + } else { > + if (!tpm2) > + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > + > + options->private = private; > + } > } > return options; > } > > static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL; > struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; > int ret = 0; > int tpm2; > @@ -874,7 +892,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload > *p, char *datablob) > goto out; > dump_options(options); > > - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > + private = options->private; > + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > @@ -888,20 +907,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload > *p, char *datablob) > goto out; > } > > - if (options->pcrlock) { > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); > + if (private->pcrlock) { > + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); > if (ret < 0) { > pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); > goto out; > } > } > out: > + kfree_sensitive(options->private); > kfree_sensitive(options); > return ret; > } > > static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL; > struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; > int ret = 0; > int tpm2; > @@ -919,7 +940,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload > *p, char *datablob) > goto out; > dump_options(options); > > - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > + private = options->private; > + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > @@ -931,14 +953,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > if (ret < 0) > pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > - if (options->pcrlock) { > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); > + if (private->pcrlock) { > + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); > if (ret < 0) { > pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); > goto out; > } > } > out: > + kfree_sensitive(options->private); > kfree_sensitive(options); > return ret; > } > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > index 6340823f8b53..94e01249b921 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload > *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options, > u8 *src, u32 len) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; > const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; > u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > u8 *work = scratch, *work1; > @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload > *payload, > work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, > asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); > > - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { > + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) { > unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; > /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ > w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); > @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload > *payload, > goto err; > } > > - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); > + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle); > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); > > @@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload > *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options, > u8 **buf) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; > int ret; > struct tpm2_key_context ctx; > u8 *blob; > @@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload > *payload, > return -ENOMEM; > > *buf = blob; > - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > > memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); > blob += ctx.priv_len; > @@ -233,6 +235,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; > off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; > struct tpm_buf buf, sized; > int blob_len = 0; > @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > u32 flags; > int rc; > > - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); > + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash); > if (hash < 0) > return hash; > > - if (!options->keyhandle) > + if (!private->keyhandle) > return -EINVAL; > > rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); > @@ -268,18 +271,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > goto out_put; > } > > - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); > + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); > if (rc) > goto out; > > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, > - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > /* sensitive */ > - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len); > + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, private->blobauth_len); > > - if (options->blobauth_len) > - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, > options->blobauth_len); > + if (private->blobauth_len) > + tpm_buf_append(&sized, private->blobauth, > + private->blobauth_len); > > tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len); > tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len); > @@ -292,14 +296,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > /* key properties */ > flags = 0; > - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; > + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; > flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | > TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT); > tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags); > > /* policy */ > - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len); > - if (options->policydigest_len) > - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, > options->policydigest_len); > + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, private->policydigest_len); > + if (private->policydigest_len) > + tpm_buf_append(&sized, private->policydigest, > + private->policydigest_len); > > /* public parameters */ > tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL); > @@ -373,6 +378,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > u32 *blob_handle) > { > u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; > struct tpm_buf buf; > unsigned int private_len; > unsigned int public_len; > @@ -392,7 +398,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > } > > /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ > - if (!options->keyhandle) > + if (!private->keyhandle) > return -EINVAL; > > /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ > @@ -433,11 +439,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > return rc; > } > > - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); > + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); > if (rc) > goto out; > > - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, > + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, private->keyauth, > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); > @@ -481,6 +487,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_options *options, > u32 blob_handle) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; > struct tpm_header *head; > struct tpm_buf buf; > u16 data_len; > @@ -502,10 +509,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > if (rc) > goto out; > > - if (!options->policyhandle) { > + if (!private->policyhandle) { > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, > - options->blobauth, > - options->blobauth_len); > + private->blobauth, > + private->blobauth_len); > } else { > /* > * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the > @@ -518,9 +525,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated > * password. > */ > - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle, > + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, private->policyhandle, > NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, > - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); > + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); > if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, > TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); > } else { > > -- > 2.51.0 >
