Quoting Kohei KaiGai ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> This patch enables to export code/name pair of capabilities supported
> on the running kernel, under the /sys/kernel/capability .
> We can apply it onto the latest Linus's git tree.
> 
> Changes from the previous version:
> - I added "names/" ans "codes/" directories, and we can use them
>   to lookup capability code or name non-sequentially.
>   In the previous version, we had to scan whole of entries to lookup
>   capability name by its code.
>   (required by Andrew Morgan)
> - I added an assertion when "mkcapname.sh" works incorrectly.
>   (required by Serge E.Hallyn)
> 
> In addition, Andrew suggested me to export these translation by symlinks
> to reduce the number of invocation of system call.
> However, current sysfs interface does not allows to create symlinks with
> invalid indication.
> Thus, this patch exports them as regular files.
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ ls -R /sys/kernel/capability/
> /sys/kernel/capability/:
> codes  names  version
> 
> /sys/kernel/capability/codes:
> 0  10  12  14  16  18  2   21  23  25  27  29  30  32  4  6  8
> 1  11  13  15  17  19  20  22  24  26  28  3   31  33  5  7  9
> 
> /sys/kernel/capability/names:
> cap_audit_control    cap_kill              cap_net_raw     cap_sys_nice
> cap_audit_write      cap_lease             cap_setfcap     cap_sys_pacct
> cap_chown            cap_linux_immutable   cap_setgid      cap_sys_ptrace
> cap_dac_override     cap_mac_admin         cap_setpcap     cap_sys_rawio
> cap_dac_read_search  cap_mac_override      cap_setuid      cap_sys_resource
> cap_fowner           cap_mknod             cap_sys_admin   cap_sys_time
> cap_fsetid           cap_net_admin         cap_sys_boot    cap_sys_tty_config
> cap_ipc_lock         cap_net_bind_service  cap_sys_chroot
> cap_ipc_owner        cap_net_broadcast     cap_sys_module
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ cat /sys/kernel/capability/codes/20
> cap_sys_pacct
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ cat /sys/kernel/capability/names/cap_mknod
> 27
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$
> --------------------------------------------------------
> Any comment please.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> ----
>  scripts/mkcapnames.sh |   44 +++++++++++++++++++
>  security/Kconfig      |    9 ++++
>  security/Makefile     |   11 +++++
>  security/capability.c |  115 
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/scripts/mkcapnames.sh b/scripts/mkcapnames.sh
> index e69de29..9e7290f 100644
> --- a/scripts/mkcapnames.sh
> +++ b/scripts/mkcapnames.sh
> @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
> +#!/bin/sh
> +
> +#
> +# generate a cap_names.h file from include/linux/capability.h
> +#
> +
> +CAPHEAD="`dirname $0`/../include/linux/capability.h"
> +REGEXP='^#define CAP_[A-Z_]+[        ]+[0-9]+$'
> +NUMCAP=`cat "$CAPHEAD" | egrep -c "$REGEXP"`
> +
> +echo '#ifndef CAP_NAMES_H'
> +echo '#define CAP_NAMES_H'
> +echo
> +echo '/*'
> +echo ' * Do NOT edit this file directly.'
> +echo ' * This file is generated from include/linux/capability.h 
> automatically'
> +echo ' */'
> +echo
> +echo '#if !defined(SYSFS_CAP_NAME_ENTRY) || !defined(SYSFS_CAP_CODE_ENTRY)'
> +echo '#error cap_names.h should be included from security/capability.c'
> +echo '#else'
> +echo "#if $NUMCAP != CAP_LAST_CAP + 1"
> +echo '#error mkcapnames.sh cannot collect capabilities correctly'
> +echo '#else'
> +cat "$CAPHEAD" | egrep "$REGEXP" \
> +    | awk '{ printf("SYSFS_CAP_NAME_ENTRY(%s,%s);\n", tolower($2), $2); }'
> +echo
> +echo 'static struct attribute *capability_name_attrs[] = {'
> +cat "$CAPHEAD" | egrep "$REGEXP" \
> +    | awk '{ printf("\t&%s_name_attr.attr,\n", tolower($2)); } END { print 
> "\tNULL," }'
> +echo '};'
> +
> +echo
> +cat "$CAPHEAD" | egrep "$REGEXP" \
> +    | awk '{ printf("SYSFS_CAP_CODE_ENTRY(%s,%s);\n", tolower($2), $2); }'
> +echo
> +echo 'static struct attribute *capability_code_attrs[] = {'
> +cat "$CAPHEAD" | egrep "$REGEXP" \
> +    | awk '{ printf("\t&%s_code_attr.attr,\n", tolower($2)); } END { print 
> "\tNULL," }'
> +echo '};'
> +
> +echo '#endif'
> +echo '#endif'
> +echo '#endif'
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 25ffe1b..b79e830 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -91,6 +91,15 @@ config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
> 
>         If in doubt, answer N.
> 
> +config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES_EXPORT
> +     bool "Exporting capabilities kernel supported"
> +     depends on SECURITY_CAPABILITIES && SYSFS

Oh no, we're being bit by this again...  When SECURITY=n, capabilities
are compiled in but SECURITY_CAPABILITIES=n.

Months ago I floated the following patch so we'd have a CONFIG variable
to let us know whether commoncap is compiled in.  You might want to use
this and depend on CONFIG_COMMONCAP?  (Though really I personally don't
think you need your own config variable for this)

Other than that, this tested fine for me.

thanks,
-serge

>From 54c70ca7671750fe8986451fae91d42107d0ca90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2007 10:33:33 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] capabilities: define CONFIG_COMMONCAP

currently the compilation of commoncap.c is determined
through Makefile logic.  So there is no single CONFIG
variable which can be relied upon to know whether it
will be compiled.

Define CONFIG_COMMONCAP to be true when lsm is not
compiled in, or when the capability or rootplug modules
are compiled.  These are the cases when commoncap is
currently compiled.  Use this variable in security/Makefile
to determine commoncap.c's compilation.

Apart from being a logic cleanup, this is needed by the
upcoming cap_bset patch so that prctl can know whether
PR_SET_BSET should be allowed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
 security/Kconfig  |    4 ++++
 security/Makefile |    9 +++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 8086e61..02b33fa 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
          
          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config COMMONCAP
+       bool
+       default !SECURITY || SECURITY_CAPABILITIES || SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
+
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index ef87df2..7cccc81 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -5,14 +5,11 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)                     += keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)      += selinux
 
-# if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
-ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
-obj-y          += commoncap.o
-endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMMONCAP)                        += commoncap.o
 
 # Object file lists
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)                 += security.o dummy.o inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)         += selinux/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)    += commoncap.o capability.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)                += commoncap.o root_plug.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)    += capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)                += root_plug.o
-- 
1.5.1.1.GIT

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