Matthew Garrett <mj...@srcf.ucam.org> writes: > On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 03:12:52PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Matthew Garrett <mj...@srcf.ucam.org> writes: >> > The driving force behind this code right now is that our choices are >> > either (1) do something like this, or (2) disable kexec entirely. >> >> Actually there is an interesting question here. Why does even EFI secure >> boot justify this? If I install my own key in EFI I should be able to >> boot a kernel that does anything I want it to. My machine doing what I >> want it to is the point of trusted boot is it not? > > The full implementation should trust keys that are trusted by the > platform, so it'd boot any kexec image you cared to sign. Or simply > patch this code out and rebuild and self-sign, or disable the code that > turns off the capability when in secure boot mode. I've no objection to > putting that behind an #ifdef.
I will be happy to see a version of kexec that accepts signed images, allowing the functionality to work in your brave new world where everything must be signed. Until then I don't see a point in merging anything else. I will be happy to see some reasonable patchs for signing support on the kexec path. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
