Matthew Garrett <m...@redhat.com> writes: > kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel > to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to > support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable > loading entirely in that situation.
Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebied...@xmission.com> This makes no sense. The naming CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE is attrocious, you aren't implementing or enforcing secure firmware. You don't give any justification for this other than to support some silly EFI feature. Why would anyone want this if we were not booting under EFI? Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
