On Wed, 2012-09-19 at 13:08 +0930, Rusty Russell wrote: > Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes: > > > On Wed, 2012-09-12 at 17:04 +0930, Rusty Russell wrote: > >> "H. Peter Anvin" <h...@zytor.com> writes: > >> > >> > On 09/06/2012 11:13 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > >> >> Instead of (or in addition to) kernel module signing, being able to > >> >> reason > >> >> about the origin of a kernel module would be valuable in situations > >> >> where an OS already trusts a specific file system, file, etc, due to > >> >> things like security labels or an existing root of trust to a partition > >> >> through things like dm-verity. > >> >> > >> >> This introduces a new syscall (currently only on x86), similar to > >> >> init_module, that has only two arguments. The first argument is used as > >> >> a file descriptor to the module and the second argument is a pointer to > >> >> the NULL terminated string of module arguments. > >> >> > >> > > >> > Please use the standard naming convention, which is an f- prefix (i.e. > >> > finit_module()). > >> > >> Good point; I just did a replace here. > > > > Have you pushed out the changes? And if so, to where? > > No, I kept them in my patch series but out of linux-next, since I > thought you disliked the placement of the security hooks?
I thought about it some more. The call to security_kernel_module_from_file() from copy_module_from_user() doesn't provide any information, not the buffer contents nor the signature. The only thing IMA-appraisal can do is to fail the request with INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. This is reflected in the IMA-appraisal patch I posted http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=134739023306344&w=2. Please add my Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@us.ibm.com> thanks, Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
