On 09/20/2012 12:46 AM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 01:49:52PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
<[email protected]>  wrote:

30 words. ~360 + 29 spaces + NULL = 390?

Just allocate the max then. That's tiny.

And it's actually just 330: max ten characters for an unsigned 32-bit number.

Linus,
Could you take a look at these two patches to see if I missed anything?
Thank you.

From 0806b133b5b28081adf23d0d04a99636ed3b861b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk<[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2012 11:23:01 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] debugfs: Add lock for u32_array_read

Dave Jones spotted that the u32_array_read was doing something funny:

=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

INFO: 0xffff88001f4b4970-0xffff88001f4b4977. First byte 0xbb instead of 0xcc
INFO: Allocated in u32_array_read+0xd1/0x110 age=0 cpu=6 pid=32767
         __slab_alloc+0x516/0x5a5
         __kmalloc+0x213/0x2c0
         u32_array_read+0xd1/0x110
.. snip..
INFO: Freed in u32_array_read+0x99/0x110 age=0 cpu=0 pid=32749
         __slab_free+0x3f/0x3bf
         kfree+0x2d5/0x310
         u32_array_read+0x99/0x110

Linus tracked it down and found out that "debugfs is racy for that case
[read calls in parallel on the debugfs]. At least the file->private_data
accesses are, for the case of that "u32_array" case.

In fact it is racy in ...  the whole "file->private_data" access ..
If you have multiple readers on the same file, the whole

        if (file->private_data) {
                kfree(file->private_data);
                file->private_data = NULL;
        }

        file->private_data = format_array_alloc("%u", data->array,
                                                               data->elements);

thing is just a disaster waiting to happen." He suggested
putting a lock which this patch does.

The consequence of this is that it will trigger more spinlock usage,
as this particular debugfs is used to provide a histogram of spinlock
contention. But memory corruption is a worst offender then that.

Reported-by: Dave Jones<[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds<[email protected]>
Tested-by: Raghavendra <[email protected]>

---
  fs/debugfs/file.c |    7 ++++++-
  1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/debugfs/file.c b/fs/debugfs/file.c
index 2340f69..c6d9088 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/file.c
@@ -524,6 +524,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debugfs_create_blob);
  struct array_data {
        void *array;
        u32 elements;
+       struct mutex lock;
  };

  static int u32_array_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
@@ -580,6 +581,7 @@ static ssize_t u32_array_read(struct file *file, char 
__user *buf, size_t len,
        struct array_data *data = inode->i_private;
        size_t size;

+       mutex_lock(&data->lock);
        if (*ppos == 0) {
                if (file->private_data) {
                        kfree(file->private_data);
@@ -594,8 +596,10 @@ static ssize_t u32_array_read(struct file *file, char 
__user *buf, size_t len,
        if (file->private_data)
                size = strlen(file->private_data);

-       return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos,
+       size = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos,
                                        file->private_data, size);
+       mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
+       return size;
  }

  static int u32_array_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
@@ -643,6 +647,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_u32_array(const char *name, 
umode_t mode,

        data->array = array;
        data->elements = elements;
+       mutex_init(&data->lock);

        return debugfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, data,&u32_array_fops);
  }

I was also able to reproduce the problem with pthread usage  and
David's  msleep  trick.

[   65.438698] BUG kmalloc-96 (Not tainted): Object already free
[   65.534572] BUG kmalloc-96 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten
[ 2488.195923] BUG kmalloc-96 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
all the above BUG without David's array allocation in open patch
 and Konrad's mutex patch.
(Both the patches tested separately)


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