On Wed, 2013-01-16 at 11:34 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: > I read the comment in ima_bprm_check() being called from > security_bprm_check(). > It says that files already open for write can't executed and files already > open for exec can't be open for writes. That's fine. > > I was worried about anonymous pages being modified on swap and then > faulted back in. It is not necessarily signature verification but making > sure signed processes memory is not modified later by any unsigned process > in anyway. And that includes disabling ptrace too. > > So IMA stuff does not do anything to protect against process memory being > modified using ptrace or by playing tricks with swap.
> I am not sure what will happen if I can bypass the file system and directly > write on a disk block and modify executable. (Assuming one can get block > information somehow). Does anything protect such modification? Will IMA > detect it? Sorry, this is out of scope for IMA. Dmitry has looked into this, but I'm not sure where it stands at the moment. thanks, Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
