I'd like to propose the topic of catching up to x86 exploit mitigations and security features, and potentially identifying ARM-unique mitigations/features that could be implemented. Several years ago, with Nicolas Pitre doing all the real work, I coordinated getting ARM caught up on things like userspace ASLR and stack-protector. Recently, based on work by Will Drewry, I ported seccomp-bpf to ARM. I'd like to continue this kind of thing, and I think it's overdue to examine this area again. A lot of work has already been done by grsecurity in this area (see http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3292), so it would be good to start there.
While it may expose my current ignorance of low level ARM mechanics, I'd like to examine and discuss: - RO and W^X kernel page table protections (similar to x86's DEBUG_RODATA and DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX; it's not clear to me how much LPAE and PXN is already handling this, if at all) - something like x86's SMEP and SMAP (to deter kernel exploitation from userspace) - vector table protections (needs to be protected like the x86_64 vsyscall table, RO, etc) - kernel ASLR (I'm close to having this upstreamable for x86) - fuzzing (is anyone running trinity or similar on the ARM tree?) - any other things ... ? Thanks, -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
