On 08/01/2013 01:39 PM, David Howells wrote: > The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of > some > other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever > to > mess with the cache.
Is the goal here eventually to be able to avoid the upcall to rpc.gssd
entirely? It seems a little bit roundabout to have the kernel call up
into userspace for the credentials, only to talk to a process which then
calls back into the kernel for something that the kernel has already
well-defined internally.
It seems like a non-privileged user could use this to store arbitrary
data in this keyring as a way of hiding what would otherwise be
filesystem activity or using it for some sort of odd/sneaky IPC
mechanism. Is this an intentional side effect?
Sorry if these are obvious questions. feel free to point me to
already-documented answers if they exist.
Thanks for all your work on this!
Regards,
--dkg
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