Jeff Layton <[email protected]> wrote:

> > +   /* -1 indicates the current user */
> > +   if (_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
> > +           uid = current_uid();
>
> Isn't it possible to have a valid uid of (unsigned int)-1? I know that
> at least some sites use that for "nobody". Why not just require passing
> in the correct UID?

See setresuid() and co. - there -1 is "don't change".

> Looks good overall, but I share Daniel's concerns about making
> krb5-specific infrastructure like this. Essentially this is just a
> persistent keyring that's associated with a kuid, right? Perhaps this
> could be done in such a way that it could be usable for other
> applications in the future?

It's not too hard, I suppose:

        keyctl_get_persistent(uid, prefix, destring)

eg:

        keyctl_get_persistent(-1, "_krb.", KEYCTL_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING)

giving:

        struct user_namespace
          \___ .krb_cache keyring
                \___ _krb.0 keyring
                \___ _krb.5000 keyring
                \___ _krb.5001 keyring
                |       \___ tkt785 big_key
                |       \___ tkt12345 big_key
                \___ _afs.5000 keyring
                        \___ afs.redhat.com rxrpc

The other way to do it is create one keyring per user and let userspace create
subkeyrings under that:

        struct user_namespace
          \___ .krb_cache keyring
                \___ _uid_p.0 keyring
                \___ _uid_p.5000 keyring
                \___ _uid_p.5001 keyring
                        \___ krb keyring
                        |       \___ tkt785 big_key
                        |       \___ tkt12345 big_key
                        \___ afs keyring
                                \___ afs.redhat.com rxrpc

In the above scheme, it might be worth just making these the same as the user
keyring - which means KEYCTL_SPEC_USER_KEYRING will automatically target it.

Simo:  I believe the problem you have with the user keyring is that it's not
persistent beyond the life of the processes of that UID, right?

David
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