"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.ku...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net> writes:
>
>> On Sun, Aug 11, 2013 at 9:45 AM, Aneesh Kumar K.V
>> <aneesh.ku...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>>> Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net> writes:
>>>
>>>> The change:
>>>>
>>>> commit f4e0c30c191f87851c4a53454abb55ee276f4a7e
>>>> Author: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
>>>> Date: Tue Jun 11 08:34:36 2013 +0400
>>>>
>>>> allow the temp files created by open() to be linked to
>>>>
>>>> O_TMPFILE | O_CREAT => linkat() with AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW and
>>>> /proc/self/fd/<n>
>>>> as oldpath (i.e. flink()) will create a link
>>>> O_TMPFILE | O_CREAT | O_EXCL => ENOENT on attempt to link those guys
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
>>>>
>>>> makes it possible to hardlink an O_TMPFILE file using procfs. Should
>>>> linkat(fd, "", newdirfd, newpath, AT_EMPTY_PATH) also work?
>>>>
>>>> AFAICS it currently requires CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, but I'm a bit
>>>> confused as to why linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) should have a stricter
>>>> check than linkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd/n", ...,
>>>> AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW), (The relevant change is
>>>> 11a7b371b64ef39fc5fb1b6f2218eef7c4d035e3.)
>>>>
>>>> FWIW, this program works on Linux 3.9, which makes me doubt that the
>>>> security restriction on linkat is doing any good:
>>>>
>>>> #include <stdio.h>
>>>> #include <err.h>
>>>> #include <fcntl.h>
>>>> #include <unistd.h>
>>>>
>>>> int main(int argc, char **argv)
>>>> {
>>>> char buf[128];
>>>>
>>>> if (argc != 3)
>>>> errx(1, "Usage: flink FD PATH");
>>>>
>>>> sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", atoi(argv[1]));
>>>> if (linkat(AT_FDCWD, buf, AT_FDCWD, argv[2], AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) != 0)
>>>> err(1, "linkat");
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Removing the check from the AT_EMPTY_PATH case would simplify code
>>>> that wants to write a file, fsync it, and then flink it in.
>>>
>>> I understand that this got merged upstream. But in case of the above
>>> test we would walk the path pointed by /proc/self/fd/<x> right ?
>>>
>>> ie,
>>>
>>> 20 -> /home/no-access/k
>>>
>>> will the above test work ? Now if i pass the '20' to another application
>>> I can affectively create a hardlink to that outside no-access and if k
>>> happens to have 'r' for others, then everybody will be able to read
>>> right ?. I understand that limitting the read access based on directory
>>> permission is not a good idea. But aren't we expected to keep that ?
>>
>> The symlinks in /proc/self/fd are rather magical and don't actually
>> walk the path. Give it a try :)
>>
>
> How about fd passed from one application to another(say from a1 to
> a2). a2 won't have read permission on /proc/a1/fd/ and also don't know
> the value of file descriptor he should use right ? Will the /proc/self/fd
> method work in such case ? IIUC with AT_EMPTY_PATH a2 can create the
> link in the above case right ? So if /proc/self/fd doesn't work should
> we allow that ?
Hmm I guess a2 will be able to use /proc/a2/fd/<received_fd> to create a
link ?
-aneesh
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
