On Wed, Jun 27, 2001 at 11:14:13 -0700, "H. Peter Anvin" wrote: > > > If we only allow user chroots for processes that have never been > > > chrooted before, and if the suid/sgid bits won't have any effect under > > > the new root, it should be perfectly safe to allow any user to chroot. > > > > Hmm. Dos this work with initrd and root pivoting? > > At the moment, yes. Once Viro gets his root-changes in, this breaks, > since ALL processes will be chrooted. What are those changes, and how will they break user chroots? Jörgen - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Albert D. Cahalan
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot H. Peter Anvin
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Albert D. Cahalan
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Sean Hunter
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Albert D. Cahalan
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Marcus Sundberg
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Jorgen Cederlof
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Kai Henningsen
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot H. Peter Anvin
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Kai Henningsen
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Jorgen Cederlof
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Paul Menage
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot H. Peter Anvin
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot David Wagner
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot David Wagner
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Mohammad A. Haque
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Paul Menage
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Alexander Viro
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Paul Menage
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Kai Henningsen
- Re: [PATCH] User chroot Chris Wedgwood