>From looking at the dm_crypt code, it appears that it can be interrogated to report the current key. Some quick testing shows:
# dmsetup table /dev/mapper/volume1 0 2000000 crypt aes-plain 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef 0 7:0 0 Obviously, root can in principle recover this password from the running kernel but it seems silly to make it so easy. Moreover, it seems this facility exists to support some form of automated table storage (LVM?). As we don't want anyone/anything accidentally storing our passwords on disk in the clear, we probably shouldn't facilitate this. Perhaps we can stick something here like "<secret>" that the dm_crypt constructor can reject. -- Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/