On Sun, 16 Feb 2014 20:31:01 +0800 Fabian Frederick <f...@skynet.be> wrote:
> Any user can display extented attribute names without read
> access.
>
> eg: attr -l <filename>
>
> This patch checks inode_permission in listxattr common
> function before executing vfs_listxattr.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/fs/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> @@ -543,6 +543,10 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t
> size)
> char *klist = NULL;
> char *vlist = NULL; /* If non-NULL, we used vmalloc() */
>
> + error = inode_permission(d->d_inode, MAY_READ);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
> if (size) {
> if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
> size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
erk. Doesn't this mean that if existing userspace is relying on the
current behaviour, this patch will cause breakage?
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