On 11 June 2014 00:34, Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasat...@gmail.com> wrote: > On 11 June 2014 00:25, Matthew Garrett <mj...@srcf.ucam.org> wrote: >> On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 12:17:53AM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: >> >>> It is probably just a paranoia... >>> Kconfig MODULE_SIG_UEFI should tell about threat of loading kernel >>> modules from NSA or Lenovo signed by MS or Lenovo keys.. >>> >>> This hole is opened without warning... >> >> It's not typically a hole. If an attacker has root they can just replace >> your bootloader with one signed by a trusted key and then have that >> modify the kernel before booting it. >> >> If you're using a TPM then you can mitigate this, but if you have a TPM >> then you're already performing some extra steps during the boot process. >> Just add a sysfs knob that lets you drop the db keys and incorporate >> that into the TPM management code. >> >> -- >> Matthew Garrett | mj...@srcf.ucam.org > > I was expecting this boot loader answer. > > Indeed, if system is design to prevent online modification of bootloader then > kernel parameters are protected as well... > > My statement is still valid. It is a hole... > > To prevent the hole it should be explained that one might follow > certain instructions > to take ownership of your PC. Generate your own keys and remove MS and > Vendor ones... > > It is paranoia? May be not. > > - Dmitry
I must admit that bootloader replacement is not related to kernel... It is just paranoia... - dmitry -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/