On Wed, 2014-06-11 at 03:22 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 09:24:53PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Tue, 2014-06-10 at 22:40 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > The hole is that the system trusts keys that you don't trust. The > > > appropriate thing to do is to remove that trust from the entire system, > > > not just one layer of the system. If people gain the impression that > > > they can simply pass a kernel parameter and avoid trusting the vendor > > > keys, they'll be upset to discover that it's easily circumvented. > > > > Assuming I remove all the keys I don't trust, there are still keys that > > are trusted while booting, but are not necessary afterwards. We should > > be able to limit the scope of where and when keys are trusted. > > Providing a userspace mechanism for selectively dropping keys from the > kernel seems like a good thing?
No, patch "KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key" adds signed public keys. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
