The khwrngd thread is started when a hwrng device of sufficient
quality is registered. The virtio-rng device is backed by the
hypervisor, and we trust the hypervisor to provide real entropy.
A malicious hypervisor is a scenario that's irrelevant -- such a setup
is bound to cause all sorts of badness, and a compromised hwrng is not
the biggest threat.
Given this, we are certain the quality of randomness we receive is
perfectly trustworthy. Hence, we use 100% for the factor, indicating
maximum confidence in the source.
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.s...@redhat.com>
---
Pretty small and contained patch; would be great if it is picked up for
3.17.
v2: re-word commit msg
---
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
index 0027137..2e3139e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static int probe_common(struct virtio_device *vdev)
.cleanup = virtio_cleanup,
.priv = (unsigned long)vi,
.name = vi->name,
+ .quality = 1000,
};
vdev->priv = vi;
--
1.9.3
--
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