Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify
kernel code. This should be prevented if trusted_kernel has been set, so
this patch disables userspace access to PCI regions and config access.
In future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated
devices.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garr...@nebula.com>
---
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 ++++++++-
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 312f23a..7348ed7 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -710,6 +710,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct
kobject *kobj,
loff_t init_off = off;
u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (off > dev->cfg_size)
return 0;
if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1004,6 +1007,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct
bin_attribute *attr,
resource_size_t start, end;
int i;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
break;
@@ -1105,6 +1111,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
loff_t off, size_t count)
{
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 3f155e7..701ff1a 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include "pci.h"
@@ -116,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const
char __user *buf,
int size = dev->cfg_size;
int cnt;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (pos >= size)
return 0;
if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -195,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
int cmd,
#endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
int ret = 0;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
switch (cmd) {
case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -233,7 +240,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct
vm_area_struct *vma)
struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
int i, ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || (get_trusted_kernel()))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index b91c4da..95bcbc5 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "pci.h"
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned
long, dfn,
u32 dword;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (get_trusted_kernel()))
return -EPERM;
dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
--
2.1.0
--
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