Hi, > > do { > > tid = this_cpu_read(s->cpu_slab->tid); > > c = raw_cpu_ptr(s->cpu_slab); > > - } while (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT) && unlikely(tid != c->tid)); > > + } while (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT) && > > + unlikely(tid != READ_ONCE(c->tid)));
[...] > Could you show me generated code again? The code generated without this patch in !SMP && PREEMPT kernels is: /* Hoisted load of c->tid */ ffffffc00016d3c4: f9400404 ldr x4, [x0,#8] /* this_cpu_read(s->cpu_slab->tid)) -- buggy, see [1] */ ffffffc00016d3c8: f9400401 ldr x1, [x0,#8] ffffffc00016d3cc: eb04003f cmp x1, x4 ffffffc00016d3d0: 54ffffc1 b.ne ffffffc00016d3c8 <slab_alloc_node.constprop.82+0x30> The code generated with this patch in !SMP && PREEMPT kernels is: /* this_cpu_read(s->cpu_slab->tid)) -- buggy, see [1] */ ffffffc00016d3c4: f9400401 ldr x1, [x0,#8] /* load of c->tid */ ffffffc00016d3c8: f9400404 ldr x4, [x0,#8] ffffffc00016d3cc: eb04003f cmp x1, x4 ffffffc00016d3d0: 54ffffa1 b.ne ffffffc00016d3c4 <slab_alloc_node.constprop.82+0x2c> Note that with the patch the branch results in both loads being performed again. Given that in !SMP kernels we know that the loads _must_ happen on the same CPU, I think we could go a bit further with the loop condition: while (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && unlikely(tid != READ_ONCE(c->tid))); The barrier afterwards should be sufficient to order the load of the tid against subsequent accesses to the other cpu_slab fields. > What we need to check is redoing whole things in the loop. > Previous attached code seems to me that it already did > refetching c->tid in the loop and this patch looks only handle > refetching c->tid. The refetch in the loop is this_cpu_read(s->cpu_slab->tid), not the load of c->tid (which is hoisted above the loop). > READ_ONCE(c->tid) will trigger redoing 'tid = > this_cpu_read(s->cpu_slab->tid)'? I was under the impression that this_cpu operations would always result in an access, much like the *_ONCE accessors, so we should aways redo the access for this_cpu_read(s->cpu_slab->tid). Is that not the case? Mark. [1] The arm64 this_cpu * operations are currently buggy. We generate the percpu address into a register, then perform the access with separate instructions (and could be preempted between the two). Steve Capper is currently fixing this. However, the hoisting of the c->tid load could happen regardless, whenever raw_cpu_ptr(c) can be evaluated at compile time. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/