On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 11:40 PM, Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org> wrote: > - Nothing actually broke that people cared about in the last 2.5 > years, thus this might be one of the (very very rare) cases where > preserving a breakage is the right thing to do.
> - These syscalls are rarely used, and we could as well insist that > every new context should have the permissions to (re-)acquire them > and should actively seek them - instead of inheriting it to shells > via system(), etc. The best strategy with dangerous APIs is to make > it really, really explicit when they are used. since nothing really broke and its a "nasty either way" regression wise, picking the more secure path looks the most sane. the most likely impact path is in the X world, where X normally gets iopl type permissions (even thought it doesn't need them anymore nowadays).. reverting this behavior would give all the processes X spawns off those perms as well... also the interesting question is: can a process give up these perms? otherwise it becomes a "once given, never gotten rid of" hell hole. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
