On Thu, 2015-07-02 at 13:35 +0200, Hans de Goede wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 02-07-15 10:45, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > On Wed, 2015-07-01 at 10:06 +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> >
> >> I don't really think it is sensible to be defining & implementing new
> >> network services which can't support strong encryption and authentication.
> >> Rather than passing the file descriptor to the kernel and having it do
> >> the I/O directly, I think it would be better to dissassociate the kernel
> >> from the network transport, and thus leave all sockets layer data I/O
> >> to userspace daemons so they can layer in TLS or SASL or whatever else
> >> is appropriate for the security need.
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > this hits a fundamental limit. Block IO must be done entirely in kernel
> > space or the system will deadlock. The USB stack is part of the block
> > layer and the SCSI error handling. Thus if you involve user space you
> > cannot honor memory allocation with GFP_NOFS and you break all APIs
> > where we pass GFP_NOIO in the USB stack.
> >
> > Supposed you need to reset a storage device for error handling.
> > Your user space programm does a syscall, which allocates memory
> > and needs to launder pages. It proceeds to write to the storage device
> > you wish to reset.
> >
> > It is the same problem FUSE has with writable mmap. You cannot do
> > block devices in user space sanely.
>
> So how is this dealt with for usbip ?
As far as I can tell, it isn't. Running a storage device over usbip
is a bit dangerous.
Regards
Oliver
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