On Fri, Jul 08, 2022 at 02:40:32AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
> should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
> mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and
> "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
> 
> Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND
> values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious.
> Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good
> or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real
> ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu".
> With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in
> the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
> 
> Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the
> center and became something certain platforms force-select.
> 
> The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have
> special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine
> with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or
> non-existence of that CPU capability.
> 
> Simplify the situation by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and using the
> ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options
> that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the
> removal of that will take a different route.
> 
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

For arm64:

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

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