On Tue Sep 12, 2023 at 2:11 PM EEST, David Gstir wrote:
> DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP.
>
> Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for
> hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob
> mechanism just like CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and
> parsing the blob has to happen in software.
>
> We chose the following format for the blob:
> /*
>  * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
>  *
>  * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1
>  * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
>  *            @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
>  *            AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
>  * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
>  * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
>  * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
>  *           GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it.
>  *
>  * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len 
> +
>  * AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
>  */
> struct dcp_blob_fmt {
>       __u8 fmt_version;
>       __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
>       __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
>       __le32 payload_len;
>       __u8 payload[];
> } __packed;
>
> @payload is the key provided by trusted_key_ops->seal().
>
> By default the UNIQUE device key is used, it is also possible to use
> the OTP key. While the UNIQUE device key should be unique it is not
> entirely clear whether this is the case due to unclear documentation.
> If someone wants to be sure they can burn their own unique key
> into the OTP fuse and set the use_otp_key module parameter.
>
> Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <rich...@nod.at>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <rich...@nod.at>
> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollen...@sigma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollen...@sigma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <da...@sigma-star.at>
> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  13 +
>  MAINTAINERS                                   |   9 +
>  include/keys/trusted_dcp.h                    |  13 +
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig            |   9 +-
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile           |   2 +
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c     |   6 +-
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c      | 313 ++++++++++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 363 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
>  create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt 
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 0a1731a0f0ef..c11eda8b38e0 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -6566,6 +6566,7 @@
>                       - "tpm"
>                       - "tee"
>                       - "caam"
> +                     - "dcp"
>                       If not specified then it defaults to iterating through
>                       the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the
>                       first trust source as a backend which is initialized
> @@ -6581,6 +6582,18 @@
>                       If not specified, "default" is used. In this case,
>                       the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust 
> source.
>  
> +     trusted.dcp_use_otp_key
> +                     This is intended to be used in combination with
> +                     trusted.source=dcp and will select the DCP OTP key
> +                     instead of the DCP UNIQUE key blob encryption.
> +
> +     trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test
> +                     This is intended to be used in combination with
> +                     trusted.source=dcp and will disable the check if all
> +                     the blob key is zero'ed. This is helpful for situations 
> where
> +                     having this key zero'ed is acceptable. E.g. in testing
> +                     scenarios.
> +
>       tsc=            Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC.
>                       Format: <string>
>                       [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 90f13281d297..988d01226131 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -11647,6 +11647,15 @@ S:   Maintained
>  F:   include/keys/trusted_caam.h
>  F:   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
>  
> +KEYS-TRUSTED-DCP
> +M:   David Gstir <da...@sigma-star.at>
> +R:   sigma star Kernel Team <upstream+...@sigma-star.at>
> +L:   linux-integr...@vger.kernel.org
> +L:   keyri...@vger.kernel.org
> +S:   Supported
> +F:   include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> +F:   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> +
>  KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE
>  M:   Sumit Garg <sumit.g...@linaro.org>
>  L:   linux-integr...@vger.kernel.org
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..7b2a1275c527
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + * Authors: David Gstir <da...@sigma-star.at>
> + *          Richard Weinberger <rich...@sigma-star.at>

Please remove authors list.

> + */
> +
> +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H
> +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H
> +
> +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops;
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig 
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> index dbfdd8536468..c6b80b7e5c78 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> @@ -33,6 +33,13 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
>         Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
>         (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
>  
> -if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
> +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
> +     bool "DCP-based trusted keys"
> +     depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS
> +     default y
> +     help
> +       Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend.
> +
> +if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM && 
> !TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
>  comment "No trust source selected!"
>  endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile 
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> index 735aa0bc08ef..f0f3b27f688b 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
>  trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
>  
>  trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
> +
> +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c 
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> index c6fc50d67214..8af0988be850 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
>  #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted_dcp.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
>  #include <linux/capability.h>
>  #include <linux/err.h>
> @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
>  
>  static char *trusted_key_source;
>  module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
> -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam or 
> dcp)");
>  
>  static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
>  #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
> @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source 
> trusted_key_sources[] = {
>  #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
>       { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
>  #endif
> +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP)
> +     { "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops },
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c 
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f04615cdb93f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + * Authors: David Gstir <da...@sigma-star.at>
> + *          Richard Weinberger <rich...@sigma-star.at>
> + */
> +
> +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> +#include <crypto/algapi.h>
> +#include <crypto/gcm.h>
> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/printk.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +#include <soc/fsl/dcp.h>
> +
> +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
> +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
> +
> +/**
> + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
> + *
> + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1.
> + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
> + *            @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
> + *            AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
> + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
> + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
> + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
> + *           GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of 
> it.
> + *
> + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + 
> @payload_len +
> + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN.
> + */
> +struct dcp_blob_fmt {
> +     __u8 fmt_version;
> +     __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> +     __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> +     __le32 payload_len;
> +     __u8 payload[];
> +} __packed;
> +
> +static bool use_otp_key;
> +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for 
> sealing");
> +
> +static bool skip_zk_test;
> +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are 
> zero'ed");
> +
> +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
> +{
> +     return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN;
> +}
> +
> +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool is_encrypt)
> +{
> +     int res = 0;
> +     struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
> +     DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> +     struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
> +     struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
> +     u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE];
> +
> +     if (use_otp_key)
> +             paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP;
> +     else
> +             paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE;
> +
> +     tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> +                                 CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL);
> +     if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> +             res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
> +             pr_err("Unable to request DCP pAES-ECB cipher: %i\n", res);
> +             tfm = NULL;
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
> +     if (!req) {
> +             res = -ENOMEM;
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
> +                                   CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
> +                                   crypto_req_done, &wait);
> +     res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key));
> +     if (res < 0)
> +             goto out;
> +
> +     sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +     sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +     skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128,
> +                                NULL);
> +
> +     if (is_encrypt)
> +             res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
> +     else
> +             res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
> +
> +out:
> +     skcipher_request_free(req);
> +     crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
> +
> +     return res;
> +}
> +
> +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
> +                       bool is_encrypt)
> +{
> +     struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL;
> +     struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
> +     struct crypto_aead *aead;
> +     int ret;
> +
> +     aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> +     if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
> +             ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
> +             pr_err("Unable to request AES-GCM cipher: %i\n", ret);
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
> +     if (ret < 0) {
> +             pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
> +             goto free_aead;
> +     }
> +
> +     aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL);
> +     if (!aead_req) {
> +             ret = -ENOMEM;
> +             goto free_aead;
> +     }
> +
> +     sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len);
> +     if (is_encrypt) {
> +             /*
> +              * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag.
> +              */
> +             sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
> +     } else {
> +             sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len);
> +     }
> +
> +     aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce);
> +     aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL,
> +                               NULL);
> +     aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
> +
> +     if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
> +             pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n");
> +             ret = -EINVAL;
> +             goto free_req;
> +     }
> +
> +     if (is_encrypt)
> +             ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
> +     else
> +             ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
> +
> +free_req:
> +     aead_request_free(aead_req);
> +free_aead:
> +     crypto_free_aead(aead);
> +out:
> +     return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
> +{
> +     return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false);
> +}
> +
> +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
> +{
> +     return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true);
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> +{
> +     struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
> +     int blen, ret;
> +
> +     blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
> +     if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
> +             return -E2BIG;
> +
> +     b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
> +     get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +     get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +
> +     ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key,
> +                          b->nonce, true);
> +     if (ret) {
> +             pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
> +             return ret;
> +     }
> +
> +     ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
> +     if (ret) {
> +             pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
> +             return ret;
> +     }
> +
> +     b->payload_len = get_unaligned_le32(&p->key_len);
> +     p->blob_len = blen;
> +     return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> +{
> +     struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
> +     int blen, ret;
> +
> +     if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
> +             pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
> +                    b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION);
> +             ret = -EINVAL;
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len);
> +     blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
> +     if (blen != p->blob_len) {
> +             pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen,
> +                    p->blob_len);
> +             ret = -EINVAL;
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
> +     if (ret) {
> +             pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
> +                          b->blob_key, b->nonce, false);
> +     if (ret) {
> +             pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     ret = 0;
> +out:
> +     return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int test_for_zero_key(void)
> +{
> +     static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff,
> +                              0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 
> 0x6f};
> +     void *buf = NULL;
> +     int ret = 0;
> +
> +     if (skip_zk_test)
> +             goto out;
> +
> +     buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> +     if (!buf) {
> +             ret = -ENOMEM;
> +             goto out;
> +     }
> +
> +     memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
> +
> +     ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true);
> +     if (ret)
> +             goto out;
> +
> +     if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
> +             pr_err("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n");
> +             ret = -EINVAL;
> +     }
> +out:
> +     kfree(buf);
> +     return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_init(void)
> +{
> +     int ret;
> +
> +     if (use_otp_key)
> +             pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n");
> +
> +     ret = test_for_zero_key();
> +     if (ret) {
> +             pr_err("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret);
> +
> +             return -EINVAL;
> +     }
> +
> +     return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> +}
> +
> +static void trusted_dcp_exit(void)
> +{
> +     unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> +}
> +
> +struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = {
> +     .exit = trusted_dcp_exit,
> +     .init = trusted_dcp_init,
> +     .seal = trusted_dcp_seal,
> +     .unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal,
> +     .migratable = 0,
> +};
> -- 
> 2.35.3

BR, Jarkko

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