On 6/21/24 08:45, Peter Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2024 at 07:51:26AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
...
>> But, still, what if you take a Dirty=1,Write=1 pud and pud_modify() it
>> to make it Dirty=1,Write=0?  What prevents that from being
>> misinterpreted by the hardware as being a valid 1G shadow stack mapping?
> 
> Thanks for pointing that out.  I think I was thinking it will only take
> effect on VM_SHADOW_STACK first, so it's not?
> 
> I was indeed trying to find more information on shadow stack at that time
> but I can't find as much on the pgtable implications, on e.g. whether "D=1
> + W=0" globally will be recognized as shadow stack.  At least on SDM March
> 2024 version Vol3 Chap4 pgtable entries still don't explain these details,
> or maybe I missed it.  Please let me know if there's suggestion on what I
> can read before I post a v2.

It's in the "Determination of Access Rights" section.

        A linear address is a shadow-stack address if the following are
        true of the translation of the linear address: (1) the R/W flag
        (bit 1) is 0 and the dirty flag (bit 6) is 1 in the paging-
        structure entry that maps the page containing the linear
        address; and (2) the R/W flag is 1 in every other paging-
        structure entry controlling the translation of the linear
        address.

> So if it's globally taking effect, indeed we'll need to handle them in PUDs
> too.
> 
> Asides, not sure whether it's off-topic to ask here, but... why shadow
> stack doesn't reuse an old soft-bit to explicitly mark "this is shadow
> stack ptes" when designing the spec?  Now it consumed bit 58 anyway for
> caching dirty. IIUC we can avoid all these "move back and forth" issue on
> dirty bit if so.

The design accommodates "other" OSes that are using all the software
bits for other things.

For Linux, you're right, we just ended up consuming a software bit
_anyway_ so we got all the complexity of the goofy permissions *AND*
lost a bit in the end.  Lose, lose.

>>>  /*
>>>   * mprotect needs to preserve PAT and encryption bits when updating
>>>   * vm_page_prot
>>> @@ -1377,10 +1398,25 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct 
>>> vm_area_struct *vma,
>>>  }
>>>  #endif
>>>  
>>> +static inline pud_t pudp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>>> +           unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
>>> +{
>>> +   if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
>>> +           return xchg(pudp, pud);
>>> +   } else {
>>> +           pud_t old = *pudp;
>>> +           WRITE_ONCE(*pudp, pud);
>>> +           return old;
>>> +   }
>>> +}
>>
>> Why is there no:
>>
>>      page_table_check_pud_set(vma->vm_mm, pudp, pud);
>>
>> ?  Sure, it doesn't _do_ anything today.  But the PMD code has it today.
>>  So leaving it out creates a divergence that honestly can only serve to
>> bite us in the future and will create a head-scratching delta for anyone
>> that is comparing PUD and PMD implementations in the future.
> 
> Good question, I really don't remember why I didn't have that, since I
> should have referenced the pmd helper.  I'll add them and see whether I'll
> hit something otherwise.
> 
> Thanks for the review.

One big thing I did in this review was make sure that the PMD and PUD
helpers were doing the same thing.  Would you mind circling back and
double-checking the same before you repost this?

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