On Mon, Jul 15, 2024 at 01:57:10PM +0530, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
>
>
> On 5/3/24 18:31, Joey Gouly wrote:
> > POR_EL0 is a register that can be modified by userspace directly,
> > so it must be context switched.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.go...@arm.com>
> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.mari...@arm.com>
> > Cc: Will Deacon <w...@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++++++
> > arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
> > arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 3 +++
> > arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> > b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> > index 8b904a757bd3..d46aab23e06e 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> > @@ -832,6 +832,12 @@ static inline bool system_supports_lpa2(void)
> > return cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_LPA2);
> > }
> >
> > +static inline bool system_supports_poe(void)
> > +{
> > + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_POE) &&
>
> CONFIG_ARM64_POE has not been defined/added until now ?
>
> > + alternative_has_cap_unlikely(ARM64_HAS_S1POE);
> > +}
> > +
> > int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt);
> > bool try_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 isn);
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> > b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> > index f77371232d8c..e6376f979273 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> > @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
> > u64 sctlr_user;
> > u64 svcr;
> > u64 tpidr2_el0;
> > + u64 por_el0;
> > };
>
> As there going to be a new config i.e CONFIG_ARM64_POE, should not this
> register be wrapped up with #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POE as well ? Similarly
> access into p->thread.por_el0 should also be conditional on that config.
It seems like we're a bit inconsistent here, for example tpidr2_el0 from
FEAT_SME is not guarded. Not guarding means that we can have left #ifdef's in
the C files and since system_supports_poe() checks if CONFIG_ARM64_POE is
enabled, most of the code should be optimised away anyway. So unless there's a
good reason I think it makes sense to stay this way.
>
> >
> > static inline unsigned int thread_get_vl(struct thread_struct *thread,
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > index 9e8999592f3a..62c399811dbf 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > @@ -1064,6 +1064,9 @@
> > #define POE_RXW UL(0x7)
> > #define POE_MASK UL(0xf)
> >
> > +/* Initial value for Permission Overlay Extension for EL0 */
> > +#define POR_EL0_INIT POE_RXW
>
> The idea behind POE_RXW as the init value is to be all permissive ?
Yup, the default index 0, needs to allow everything.
>
> > +
> > #define ARM64_FEATURE_FIELD_BITS 4
> >
> > /* Defined for compatibility only, do not add new users. */
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> > index 4ae31b7af6c3..0ffaca98bed6 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> > @@ -271,12 +271,23 @@ static void flush_tagged_addr_state(void)
> > clear_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR);
> > }
> >
> > +static void flush_poe(void)
> > +{
> > + if (!system_supports_poe())
> > + return;
> > +
> > + write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
> > + /* ISB required for kernel uaccess routines when chaning POR_EL0 */
> > + isb();
> > +}
> > +
> > void flush_thread(void)
> > {
> > fpsimd_flush_thread();
> > tls_thread_flush();
> > flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(current);
> > flush_tagged_addr_state();
> > + flush_poe();
> > }
> >
> > void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > @@ -371,6 +382,9 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct
> > kernel_clone_args *args)
> > if (system_supports_tpidr2())
> > p->thread.tpidr2_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TPIDR2_EL0);
> >
> > + if (system_supports_poe())
> > + p->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
> > +
> > if (stack_start) {
> > if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(p)))
> > childregs->compat_sp = stack_start;
> > @@ -495,6 +509,19 @@ static void erratum_1418040_new_exec(void)
> > preempt_enable();
> > }
> >
> > +static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next)
> > +{
> > + if (!system_supports_poe())
> > + return;
> > +
> > + current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
> > + if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) {
> > + write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
> > + /* ISB required for kernel uaccess routines when chaning
> > POR_EL0 */
> > + isb();
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > /*
> > * __switch_to() checks current->thread.sctlr_user as an optimisation.
> > Therefore
> > * this function must be called with preemption disabled and the update to
> > @@ -530,6 +557,7 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct
> > *prev,
> > ssbs_thread_switch(next);
> > erratum_1418040_thread_switch(next);
> > ptrauth_thread_switch_user(next);
> > + permission_overlay_switch(next);
> >
> > /*
> > * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
>
