On Tue, Jul 21, 2026 at 03:08:11PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Tue, Jul 14, 2026 at 11:58:24AM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote: > > Hi, > > > > These backports harden BPF JIT against spectre-v2 class of attacks. Without > > a predictor flush, execution of new BPF program may use stale prediction > > left behind by the freed one. > > > > To avoid this, issue an IBPB flush on all CPUs on JIT program allocation. > > The flush is conditional to spectre-v2 mitigation applied. > > > > Patch 1-2: Adds the predictor flush hook and enables it on x86 via IBPB. > > > > bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying > > x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation > > > > Patch 3-6: Narrow the flush to only unprivileged JIT allocations > > to avoid redundant flushes. Also adds pack-selection changes > > that minimizes flushes. > > > > bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF > > bpf: Skip redundant IBPB in pack allocator > > bpf: Prefer packs that won't trigger an IBPB flush on allocation > > bpf: Prefer dirty packs for eBPF allocations > > > > This one is mostly similar to 6.18: > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260713-cbpf-jit-spray-hardening-6-18-y-v1-0-755f60c55...@linux.intel.com/ > > There is no active 6.16.y kernel branch, so why is this being sent to > us?
Sorry that was a mistake. I had an old 6.16.y worktree in my machine and I assumed it was still active. Please ignore.
