Roberto Gaetano wrote:
Folks,Delegation of authority is something that indeed does need to be dealt with.I liked Jay's summary.
Let me add few lines to Bret's comments.Bret Fausett wrote:
> Jay Fenello wrote:
> >My impression of this process was that there are only
> >a few, major philosophical differences that must be
> >resolved. One is whether the DNSO will feature a top
> >down, or bottom up decision making process.
>
> This is the split, but all the talk about "top-down" and "bottom-up" at
> the Washington meeting tended to polarize the proposals, which really
> exist along a continuum. As I see it, strong top-down management with
> broad consensus-based policy-making can coexist, and the AIP proposal
> tried to do that. So did the CENTRE proposal. These two "hybrids" viewed
> the Names Council (and in the AIP proposal, the Research Committees) as
> "managers" of a consensus-building process, rather than as the
> policy-makers themselves.
>
I admit it was not easy to resist the temptation of promoting one or the
other draft, but we could rather focus on what the real problem is, and what
are the points to solve. ;>)I disagree with the wording "top-down vs. bottom-up" because, while it is
perfect for suggesting emotional reactions, it is not appropriate in
describing the difference.
In fact, no proposal is implying a top-down process. The philosophical
difference is, as somebody already pointed out in Washington, is between
"representative democracy" and "popular democracy". In other words, whether
(or rather to which extent) the membership is willing to "delegate
authority" to a body it has elected.
I have been saying this for months to little avail I might add. We support
a "representative democracy" approach, but to a lesser degree then
any of the current drafts (Other than ours) would suggest. Any delegation
must and rightfully should, be determined by the At-Large membership as
that At-Large membership decides the need is warranted. Hence, in the
beginning there should only be the implementation or recommendation of
policy on DNS issues, with respect to any DNSO to the ICANN.
The answer as to how the power balance is determined is that theMy personal opinion is that we should discuss what are the powers that will
stay with the "general assembly"of Members, and what powers will be
delegated to the Council, knowing that, if it is philosophically appropriate
to claim all the power to the Assembly, it is neither efficient nor
practical.
Council only can recommend to the ICANN policy that has been approved
by the DNSO At-Large membership. The Council may propose
policy or except policy proposals form other groups but must get
voted upon approval from the At-Large membership before recommending
it to the ICANN for review.
Constituencies is a form of gerrymandering is why Roberto.Personally, I don't think that there are great obstacles in coming to an
agreement on this point. INTA may have a more "enterprise-like" approach,
while others may have a more "city-hall-like" approach, but it should not be
difficult to make every party aware of the reasons and concerns behind each
position, and come to a common proposal.<snip>
> If there is a place for consensus, perhaps we'll find it in a strong,
> managerial Names Council that leads a consensus-building process, when
> appropriate, among a larger group of members. I'll read all of the
> proposals again with that in mind.
>
Agree.
Somebody disagrees?> >The other
> >is whether the DNSO membership will be flat and
> >inclusive, or structured and limited.
>
> Isn't the open (no constituencies) vs. structured (constituencies) Names
> Council really about making sure that all interested stakeholders have a
> voice? All five proposals understand that this is necessary; the
> proponents just solve the problem in different ways.
>
Again, the problem is wording.
Why should a flat membership be considered more "open" or more "inclusive"
than a membership structured in constituencies?
This argument is a canard. It is not likely and I would argue notOur goal is not to gather applauses on a smart wording, but to point out the
alternatives, and focus on the implications of either choice.The problem with the former, as also pointed out at the 1999-01-23
Membership meeting in Boston, is capture by a powerful entity of the
individual votes.
even possible for any capture by any "Group" of members using a
flat membership model.
This is only one problem. In fact with combining of two or more
The problem with the latter is the definition of the constituencies, the
lack of flexibility, and the relative voting power.
constituencies that is a greater risk of Capture than with a flat
model.
Or a joining of constituencies to form a coalition that is in the majorityThe risk of capture can be lowered by not allowing proxies.
IMHO, when defining a new body or a new approach to the solution of a
problem, we should avoid all paths that will be irreversible.
If capture by proxy will occurr, we will never be able to go back. OTOH, if
after start of operations we can see that the structure works reasonably,
and the voice of the end users is really limited by the lack of proxies, we
can always implement it.
Just to add my personal view, if we vote on the net, why do we need proxies
at all? It will take as much time, if not more, to the end user to mail in a
proxy than mail in a vote (unless we think of "permanent" proxies - but do
you see the problem with it?).The problem with the definition of constituencies, OTOH, has much to do with
a power struggle among constituencies.
as far as council seats but represents a minority of Stakeholders.
Again, you are looking at a potential gerrymandering problem here,
by structurally creating a "Special Interest Group" control problem.
In addition how doe you define whom belongs to which constituency?
If by ICANN, you mean the ICANN Individual Membership Organization,
I am wondering whether this is not moot in a body that has as a main purpose
not to "define" policy, but to "recommend" policy to ICANN.
In other words, ICANN will decide.
than I can agree. if however you are saying that the ICANN Board
decides, then I don't.
We only have the task of making sure thatTHere is not such thing a perfect first of all Roberto. Second, in what
the Council is representative of all constituencies. Proposals like the one
Stef made in Monterrey (distribute ignorance, or something like this) will
be perfectly fit for purpose.
way specifically would Stef's proposals be more beneficial?
You must go with majority rules. The trick is to propose policies that the
As for the worry that the Registries have about policy being recommended
"upon them", i.e. policy that will heavily affect Registries being
recommended against their will by a majority not including them, we can
correct this.
registries can deal with adequately and still meet the needs of
registrants.
Not, of course, with some kind of "generic" veto power by theThis is too complicated and is subject to too much political manipulation
Registries, as this either puts the Registries as being more equal than
others ;>) or, if every constituency will have veto power on everything,
will turn the DNC into a UN Security Council (i.e. *all* decisions are
vetoed by somebody).
that may or may not be advantageous to the Stakeholders in general.
Regards,
If veto power we may have, it should be granted only on policy decisions
*essentially* affecting the vetoing constituency. A lighter approach will be
to allow *minority* positions: if a policy proposal regarding RFC1591 passes
in spite of the opposition of ccTLDs, ICANN will know where to file it ;>).Regards
Roberto
--
Jeffrey A. Williams
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
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