> I look at the ICANN process a little differently. It isn't really a
substitute for NSI as much as it would be a substitute for the government.
Perhaps the establishment of ICANN was the worst possible way to handle the
situation -- except for all of the alternatives.
I don't think it would have been appropriate for the management of Internet
names and addresses to remain with the US goverment. What about the EU's
interests? What about Japan? What about developing nations?
And I don't think it would have been advantageous to hand the role to the
ITU, given that organization's historical record of alignment with PTTs and
slow adaptation.
> I can imagine good or bad things coming from this new cyber goverance
organization.
I'm glad you're seeing both sides.
I was one of the early critics of the original IANA proposals because they
included no provisions for a membership or direct election of any Board
members. I'd like for at-large Board membership election to move forward.
I'm fairly inflexible as an advocate of due-process and sunshine.
But these jingoistic/paranoid attacks on ICANN (e.g. Gordon's claim that
NTIA has "sold out" American Internet interests to the Europeans, or his
direct implication that ICANN intends to support governments' efforts to
intercept Internet traffic) are way off the mark.
>Suppose, for example, that ICANN actually gave ordinary people the abilty
to elect the board of directors, and it could not be controlled by big
corporate interests.
Could you go along with, "could not be captured by any single faction"
instead? If so, I'm with you. "Little interests" can be just as obnoxious,
imposing, and tyrranical as "big ones" if given the opportunity.
And the goal becomes one of creating a set of bylaws to best ensure this
outcome.
>Suppose further that privacy advocates ran a successful campaign to elect
board members who promised to require every .com domain to post its privacy
policy. I actually asked ICANN if this could happen, and I believe the
answer is yes (not that such an effort would succeed, but simply that the
board could elect to do such things, if it wanted to.
>So much will depend upon who will control this organization, and how much
"lock-in" occurs around the main root.
>Ralph Nader and I are meeting with Esther on Wed, and we'll be talking
about these things further.
I hope it goes well.
My hope is that you not get all hung up in the "who knew what and when did
they know it" story of how the interim Board was selected. The selection
was at best messy and chaotic. No question. So it is with the formation of
most new organizations.
Instead --
- Focus on the ICANN bylaws and the method for structuring the ICANN board
**going forward**
- Look in particular at the prospective election of at-large Board members
- Review ICANN's policies on due process, sunshine, conflict of interest,
etc.
- Review ICANN's performance to date in following its policies, and look to
remedies where they've fallen short.
- Identify mechanisms for ongoing checks and balances on ICANN's power and
authority. Would it be wise to have some public body (with international
representation and authority, I should think) to continue looking over
ICANN's shoulder after Sept. 2000? If so, who would this be?
I think these are the issues that matter.
Pete
___________________________________________________
Peter J. Farmer -- Director, Optical Communications
Strategies Unlimited <http://www.strategies-u.com>
Mountain View, CA
+1 650 941-3438 (voice)
+1 650 464-1243 (mobile & voice mail)
+1 650 941 5120 (fax)
