Hmmm, thats interesting. Do you run a network with any of the stuff you mentioned or do you access to corporate client with all or a good part of the stuff you mentioned?
Reason I ask, is; for knowledge's sake (like you mentioned), i could show up and we tease & poke that network and we see how both you and me can stretch those controls to their limits. And if your client is ok with us discussing our findings on a mailing list like this one, everyone benefits. My charge: 2 litres of coke, Chips & chicken. (That's close to pro bono, for an intensive pen testing exercise). What do you think? I just need your calendar to compare with mine and we find some free time to see warrup! Cheers, On 7/18/12, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: > :) Hey Phillip, your attack (whether on the Bank or a corporate; wonder if > attacking the corporate and not the Bank makes it any better evil) without > those or other certain lines of defense being in place, will definitely > succeed especially when coupled with social engineering techniques: (its > clear that in the battle between cryptanalysts and cryptographers, the > former always win: recall the knapsack algorithm, rc4/WEP, gsm security > and the rest). There are so many techniques you can leverage for attack: > from power/timing analysis to covert channels, to collusion, even the > biometrics at nuc substations is subject to false accept rates (FAR), etc, > etc. BTW in some countries, certain products are even installed at all > ISPs so they can filter email looking for keywords that can serve as a > basis for investigation. > > :)My interest in posing those lines of defense to you, was actually to try > and explore possible weaknesses in them for the interested parties so we > can go to the next lines of defense, had you replied directly to each > question and not let others speak for you. Your mentioned bank may not be > the only one with security problems, coz we have even read about bigger > ones that have been hiding their debts, fixing inter-banking/overnight > rates, and you never know the worst may come in when its realized that one > of the leading global economies have (their reserve bank) been hiding and > telling lies about their debt (and u know what, boom, another global > credit crunch) > > Thanks. > >> Peter, don't sweat it. Its clear from the excerpts below that the authors >> didn't read everything i wrote or they just don't know what they are >> talking about (could have just concentrated on googling counter >> responses). >> First i thought it was me but even after you clearly stating it that the >> victim IS NOT THE BANK; its still not clear enough for some people!!!! >> (Sigh, sigh, cough, cough). >> Alternatively, you could use gimp to do a nice picture of the attack to >> save yourself 1000 words (i think the message will be clearer then). >> >> But let me give it one more try. THE VICTIM IS A CORPORATE COMPANY NOT >> THE >> BANK. >> >> ++++++++++++++++ I remember point that out clearly +++++++++++++++++ >> >> My target is the local DNS server on the company LAN. I wouldn't sweat >> it trying to knock out the bank unless when push comes to shove and >> even so, it would be my very last option (am a lazy dude, with no jail >> wish and love succeeding while sipping a soda). >> >> +++++++++++++ End +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> >> >> Just a little secret though, I have run a similar attack before (ofcourse >> with the blessing of the client) to demonstrate something. And the only >> difference was that i wasn't using the exploit that this thread stemmed >> from. >> >> And yes -- i was only hypothesizing on a few things but mostly (esp. the >> tech stuff); stating facts! >> >> >> >> ==================== Excerpts begin Here ============================== >> >>> But even then, are u sure, there is a Bank that will allow the use of >>> unsecured DNS? You know something, you could be playing about with their >>> honey pots..... Can you let an unknown host join the network, run in >>> promiscuous mode, have access to other segments and services of the >>> corporate network, etc? Some corporates even go the extent of saying for >>> example (just an example): traffic from IBM should not pass through >>> certain Microsoft routers even if they are the best path available, let >>> alone that from Iraq passing via Pentagon routers... >> >> >>> Goodness. If every bank in this part of the world has equally dismal >>> security policies, I will seriously reconsider opening an account here. >> >>> Why is it like this? It is perfectly possible to achieve good security >> with >>> free software and free information. Why do some security admins insist >>> on >>> sucking at what they are doing? >> >>> Note that Phillip's attack and Davis's defence both are more-or-less >>> conjecture at this point, Peter's anecdote notwithstanding. It is >> perfectly >>> possible that Phillip's attack would be doomed from the get-go; it is >>> also >>> perfectly possible that the security of the target (let's call it >>> Hypothetical Bank or HB, so no external eyes are mistakenly led to >>> believe >>> we're actually planning something, eh) is lacking due to human >>> oversight. >>> There's really no way to tell for sure, short of a security audit or an >>> actual intrusion attempt. >> >> =================== END OF EXCERPTS ================================= >> >> >> -- >> - Phillip. >> >> 鄭occdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in >> waht >> oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the >> frist >> and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. >> The rset can be a toatl mses and >> you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed >> ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers it >> out aynawy." >> > > > -- - Phillip. “Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. The rset can be a toatl mses and you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers it out aynawy." _______________________________________________ The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: [email protected] Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: http://www.infocom.co.ug/ The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in any way.
