But Sanga, you are just adding firewood to the fire ;-) This kind of stuff is much better than the "Windows is better than Linux" debates.
I admire Phillip's technical creativity and knowledge. My friend Davis on the other hand is also a worthy adversary. Bravo guys! Kind regards, Bernard On 19 July 2012 00:26, sanga collins <[email protected]> wrote: > I love a good flame war ... Encore! > > > On Wednesday, July 18, 2012, Phillip Simbwa wrote: >> >> Hmmm, thats interesting. >> >> Do you run a network with any of the stuff you mentioned or do you >> access to corporate client with all or a good part of the stuff you >> mentioned? >> >> Reason I ask, is; for knowledge's sake (like you mentioned), i could >> show up and we tease & poke that network and we see how both you and >> me can stretch those controls to their limits. >> And if your client is ok with us discussing our findings on a mailing >> list like this one, everyone benefits. >> >> My charge: 2 litres of coke, Chips & chicken. (That's close to pro >> bono, for an intensive pen testing exercise). What do you think? >> >> I just need your calendar to compare with mine and we find some free >> time to see warrup! >> >> Cheers, >> >> >> On 7/18/12, [email protected] >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> > :) Hey Phillip, your attack (whether on the Bank or a corporate; wonder >> > if >> > attacking the corporate and not the Bank makes it any better evil) >> > without >> > those or other certain lines of defense being in place, will definitely >> > succeed especially when coupled with social engineering techniques: (its >> > clear that in the battle between cryptanalysts and cryptographers, the >> > former always win: recall the knapsack algorithm, rc4/WEP, gsm security >> > and the rest). There are so many techniques you can leverage for attack: >> > from power/timing analysis to covert channels, to collusion, even the >> > biometrics at nuc substations is subject to false accept rates (FAR), >> > etc, >> > etc. BTW in some countries, certain products are even installed at all >> > ISPs so they can filter email looking for keywords that can serve as a >> > basis for investigation. >> > >> > :)My interest in posing those lines of defense to you, was actually to >> > try >> > and explore possible weaknesses in them for the interested parties so we >> > can go to the next lines of defense, had you replied directly to each >> > question and not let others speak for you. Your mentioned bank may not >> > be >> > the only one with security problems, coz we have even read about bigger >> > ones that have been hiding their debts, fixing inter-banking/overnight >> > rates, and you never know the worst may come in when its realized that >> > one >> > of the leading global economies have (their reserve bank) been hiding >> > and >> > telling lies about their debt (and u know what, boom, another global >> > credit crunch) >> > >> > Thanks. >> > >> >> Peter, don't sweat it. Its clear from the excerpts below that the >> >> authors >> >> didn't read everything i wrote or they just don't know what they are >> >> talking about (could have just concentrated on googling counter >> >> responses). >> >> First i thought it was me but even after you clearly stating it that >> >> the >> >> victim IS NOT THE BANK; its still not clear enough for some people!!!! >> >> (Sigh, sigh, cough, cough). >> >> Alternatively, you could use gimp to do a nice picture of the attack >> >> to >> >> save yourself 1000 words (i think the message will be clearer then). >> >> >> >> But let me give it one more try. THE VICTIM IS A CORPORATE COMPANY NOT >> >> THE >> >> BANK. >> >> >> >> ++++++++++++++++ I remember point that out clearly +++++++++++++++++ >> >> >> >> My target is the local DNS server on the company LAN. I wouldn't sweat >> >> it trying to knock out the bank unless when push comes to shove and >> >> even so, it would be my very last option (am a lazy dude, with no jail >> >> wish and love succeeding while sipping a soda). >> >> >> >> +++++++++++++ End +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> >> >> >> >> >> Just a little secret though, I have run a similar attack before >> >> (ofcourse >> >> with the blessing of the client) to demonstrate something. And the only >> >> difference was that i wasn't using the exploit that this thread stemmed >> >> from. >> >> >> >> And yes -- i was only hypothesizing on a few things but mostly (esp. >> >> the >> >> tech stuff); stating facts! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ==================== Excerpts begin Here ============================== >> >> >> >>> But even then, are u sure, there is a Bank that will allow the use of >> >>> unsecured DNS? You know something, you could be playing about with >> >>> their >> >>> honey pots..... Can you let an unknown host join the network, run in >> >>> promiscuous mode, have access to other segments and services of the >> >>> corporate network, etc? Some corporates even go the extent of saying >> >>> for >> >>> example (just an example): traffic from IBM should not pass through >> >>> certain Microsoft routers even if they are the best path available, >> >>> let >> >>> alone that from Iraq passing via Pentagon routers... >> >> >> >> >> >>> Goodness. If every bank in this part of the world has equally dismal >> >>> security policies, I will seriously reconsider opening an account >> >>> here. >> >> >> >>> Why is it like this? It is perfectly possible to achieve good security >> >> with >> >>> free software and free information. Why do some security admins insist >> >>> on >> >>> sucking at what they are doing? >> >> >> >>> Note that Phi>> 鄭occdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it >> >>> deosn't mttaer in >> >> >> waht >> >> oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the >> >> frist >> >> and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. >> >> The rset can be a toatl mses and >> >> you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed >> >> ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers >> >> it >> >> out aynawy." >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> -- >> - Phillip. >> >> “Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in >> waht >> oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the >> frist >> and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. >> The rset can be a toatl mses and >> you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed >> ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers it >> out aynawy." >> _______________________________________________ >> The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug >> >> Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: >> [email protected] >> Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ >> Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug >> To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug >> >> The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: >> http://www.infocom.co.ug/ >> >> The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including >> attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in >> any way. > > > > -- > Sanga M. Collins > Network Engineering > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Google Voice: (954) 324-1365 > E- fax: (435) 578 7411 > > _______________________________________________ > The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug > > Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: [email protected] > Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ > Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug > To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug > > The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: > http://www.infocom.co.ug/ > > The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including > attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in > any way. -- Bernard Wanyama Technical Manager SYNTECH ASSOCIATES Ltd Kampala, Uganda Cell: +256 712 193979 Fixed: +256 414 251591 Web: www.syntechug.com Email: [email protected] _______________________________________________ The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: [email protected] Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: http://www.infocom.co.ug/ The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in any way.
