On 2022-11-20 at 18:58 +0000, Slavko via mailop wrote:
> Dňa 20. novembra 2022 17:55:18 UTC používateľ Ken Simpson <
> ksimp...@mailchannels.com> napísal:
> > One-time passwords can always be man-in-the-middle'd, since there's
> > no way
> > for the user to determine whether or not there is someone in the
> > middle
> > snooping their OTP and password. The phishing attack only has to
> > deceive
> > the user into entering their password and their OTP, both of which
> > can then
> > be forwarded to the real login page behind the scenes.
> 
> Now we are back on start (my first message), that OTP solves problem
> only partially -- user doesn't need to take action, as passwords will
> expire soon, often sooner, than would be password changed by user.
> 
> And by this, OTP doesn't solves sending SPAM from leaked passwords
> + OTP as while token is valid, they can misuse victim's account and
> send tons of SPAMs in relative short time. And one still have to
> apply some form of rate limiting...

An OTP would be valid for *seconds*. Maybe even *minutes*. That greatly
reduces the risks of password stealing. Of course, a system could
require an OTP for login, but once the attacker authenticates "live",
the session might end up open at the bad guy browser for months...



> 
> > Hopefully, WebAuthn <https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/> gains
> > traction, making passwords irrelevant by allowing devices to
> > maintain a secure authentication key for each website within a
> > trusted execution environment such as Apple's so-called "Secure
> > Enclave."
> 
> Hmm, i am not aware of that and i am not sure, if i want to leave
> browser (or device) to decide if i am logged in or not. As soon or
> latter it will be misused and leave users in middle state -- you will
> not be logged in, but site will be able to identify you.

Webauthn uses a "device" which will provide an authentication _for a
given website_. That should remove the risk of leaking your password to
a fake website, as it would be a different url.

> 

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