SSL certificates do not, and have never, "protected against MiTM". The certificate authority trust
model can best be summarized as "someone else's DNS resolver and connection", it is not a statement
of who actually owns the domain or what server is actually supposed to be on the other end.
If you want a trust model of "who is actually authorized to be on the other end of this connection",
you need to use DANE or some other DNSSEC-authenticated system.
Matt
On 10/22/23 6:23 AM, Paul Menzel via mailop wrote:
Dear Mary,
Am 22.10.23 um 11:48 schrieb Mary via mailop:
from what I understand, this is a government issued wiretapping
against that specific services/servers (hosted by Hetzner and Linode
in Germany?) and not a general TLS exploit.
so nothing interesting or unique.
It was interesting and surprising to me, as the common perception is, that SSL certificates protect
against MiTM attacks as it should provide authenticity.
And it is interesting to think about, how to protect better against this kind
of attack.
Hugo Landau wrote down some ideas in *Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception
incident* [1].
Would DANE have prevented the MiTM attack under the assumption, that DNSSEC works and is not
compromised in your setup?
Kind regards,
Paul
[1]: https://www.devever.net/~hl/xmpp-incident
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