Our Marxism 
1. Origins 
The SACP has, historically, described its ideological position as Marxist-Leninist. 

In describing ourselves in this way we have been: 

Locating ourselves as a revolutionary party with its historical roots in the Communist 
International, an international movement which came into existence in 1919, inspired 
by, and in the direct aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Allegiance to the 
Communist International (also referred to as the Third International) marked a 
self-conscious break with what has turned out to be the other major tradition of 
socialism in the 20th century - social democracy. The Communist Party in South Africa, 
when it launched in 1921, saw itself as part of an international revolutionary 
movement, in contrast to the more reformist perspectives and programmes of the social 
democractic/labour party current. 
Indeed, the founding cores of many Third International parties came from the left of 
social democratic parties affiliated to the Second International. South Africa was no 
exception, some of the leading personalities in the launch of the CPSA in 1921 had 
broken from the SA Labour Party in 1915. The immediate cause of these left platforms 
was the support given by the right-wing of the social democratic parties to the 
war-effort of their respective national bourgeoisies in the intra-imperialist First 
World War (1914-1918). The left, by contrast, called for working class unity across 
national frontiers. In this context, another core principle of the Third International 
parties (including the CPSA) was proletarian internationalism. 
The third, self-defining feature of the Communist Parties of the Third International 
was their commitment to building disciplined, vanguard parties, made up of 
revolutionary cadres, unified around a relatively clear, ideological programme. In 
other words, the Communist Parties, including the CPSA, saw themselves as ideological 
parties, distinct from broader, ideologically more loose, movement-like parties, which 
were often typical of the earlier social democratic/labour parties. To maintain the 
ideological and organisational cohesion of these new Communist Parties, democratic 
centralism was applied, this meant that while debate and participation by 
rank-and-file members was encouraged, once programmatic decisions had been taken, 
disciplined adherence was required. In theory, at least, factions and platforms within 
the Party were not allowed. 
These were the founding, corner-stone principles of the CPSA, and it was these 
principles that, in the decade and a half after its launch in 1921 came to be 
described as "Marxist-Leninist". The SACP continues to believe in the fundamental 
validity of each of these founding principles. But, of course, we have also always 
believed in the necessity of a continuous interaction between theory and practice. Not 
surprisingly, the collective understanding we bring to the concepts of "revolution", 
"internationalism" and "vanguard party" have developed enormously in the light of our 
own South African experience, as well as international revolutionary practice through 
the course of this 20th century. 

2. A Party of revolution 
When the CPSA was launched in 1921, it believed that a world socialist revolution was 
on the agenda. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution was a trumpet call to a world-wide 
workers' insurrection. The revolution would move rapidly from Russia to the industrial 
heartland of Europe, and from there it would impact upon the world, including South 
Africa. 

The CPSA comrades were not alone in these hopes, they were very characteristic of the 
early years of the Communist International. The First World War, so it was believed, 
demonstrated the terminal crisis of capitalism. As if to confirm this perspective, the 
end of the war was to be followed by a decade and a half of chronic crisis in the most 
advanced capitalist countries - marked by mass unemployment, soaring inflation, 
political instability and the Great Depression. 

Moreover, in the first years following the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, there 
were to be insurrectionary struggles by workers, some of which were partially 
successful, at least for a short period - in northern Italy, in Hungary, in parts of 
Germany. But these struggles were contained, and then crushed. Even in South Africa, 
less than a year after the launch of the CPSA, white workers on the Rand launched an 
armed struggle against the Chamber of Mines and the Smuts government - the 1922 Rand 
Revolt. The Rand Revolt was smashed by the Smuts government, deploying the army and 
even airforce bombers. But this revolt, although partially and loosely inspired by the 
Bolsheviks, was essentially about white mine-workers seeking to preserve their 
racially privileged status in the face of the mine-bosses's cost-cutting strategies. 

By the mid and late 1920s, it was apparent that the hoped-for, world-wide Red 
Revolution, was not around the corner. Only in the Soviet Union workers' power 
remained relatively intact. The bourgeoisies of countries in which workers had come 
closest to seizing power turned to the counter-revolution - in Hungary, in Spain, in 
Italy, in Germany, in Austria - it was not a Red Revolution, but a khaki 
counter-revolution of fascism and nazism that prevailed. 

What had gone wrong? In Moscow, in the Communist International headquarters, the 
Bulgarian revolutionary, George Dmitrov argued that the newly-formed Communist Parties 
had isolated themselves from the broader worker and popular movements of their 
countries. They had failed to build united fronts (with the social democratic and 
other labour forces), still less broader popular fronts, and had conducted themselves 
in far too sectarian a manner. They had left space wide open for fascism, which had, 
in many countries, through a combination of terror and demagogy, succeeded in 
mobilising popular forces. 

In Italy, Antonio Gramsci (significantly a prisoner in a fascist jail at the time) 
also grappled, in a vast (and sometimes complex) set of prison writings, with the 
defeat of the left. Like Dmitrov, he believed that the working class parties had 
isolated themselves, they had failed to develop a "hegemonic" project, capable of 
leading the broadest range of popular social forces. Gramsci also argued that in the 
more developed capitalist countries (like Italy and Germany), communists had seriously 
under-rated the resilience and depth of the capitalist state. Unlike the 
crisis-ridden, backward, semi-feudal Tsarist state of Russia in 1917, the repressive 
apparatuses of modern capitalist states were surrounded by vast protective trenches - 
media, cultural, educational, economic institutions of all kinds. A direct "frontal 
assault" on the modern capitalist state was unlikely to succeed, unless it had been 
preceded by a long "war of position" for working class hegemony, across the len!
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gth and breadth of society. Gramsci was, in effect, beginning to question the simple 
revolution/reform dichotomy, the war of position for hegemony was going to have to be 
a struggle for revolutionary-reforms. 

The Communist Party in South Africa was not to be directly influenced by the writings 
of Gramsci or Dmitrov until very much later (in the 1970s and 80s). But the CPSA was 
also compelled to make its own reassessment of what it meant to be a party of 
revolution, in a world in which the Red Revolution appeared to have receded. 

3. A Party of Internationalism 
The founding members of the CPSA were white workers and revolutionary intellectuals 
who brought a variety of modern socialist traditions to South Africa, mainly from 
Britain and Eastern Europe. From the outset, however, the CPSA's commitment to 
"internationalism" was understood to mean that it was a Party that sought to represent 
and organise "all workers". The slogan "Workers of the World Unite", was understood to 
mean, in South African conditions, the need for the unity of black and white workers. 
It was this message that the CPSA attempted to propagate (without great success) in 
the course of the 1922 Rand Revolt. 

>From the outset the CPSA was committed to non-racialism, not just as a long-term goal 
>for society, but as a reality to be practised within the Party itself. In 1924, long 
>before "affirmative action" was in vogue as a term, the CPSA congress resolved that 
>the Party should "Africanise" itself. This was not just a well-meaning, but empty, 
>resolution. By 1928 the CPSA had 1 750 members, of whom 1 600 were black. More 
>importantly, the Party took practical steps to ensure that African working-class 
>cadres were developed. The Party, in the mid-1920s, pioneered literacy classes, and 
>political education night schools. Very soon, a number of outstanding African 
>comrades, including Albert Nzula (the Party's first African general secretary), Josie 
>Mpama, Johannes Nkosi, Edwin Motsuenyane and Moses Kotane assumed leadership 
>positions within the Party. 

>From 1924, then, the Party had begun to Africanise itself in terms of its membership 
>and leadership (making it a pioneer, and for most of the next seven decades, the only 
>non-racial political party in terms of membership in South Africa). But the Party's 
>strategic perspective was not yet "Africanised". In 1928/29, partly as the result of 
>an internal debate, and principally as a result of a Communist International 
>resolution, the CPSA changed its strategic perspective to a national liberation 
>struggle in alliance with the still relatively undeveloped ANC. The CPSA began to 
>advance the slogan of majority rule, calling for a Black Republic. The struggle for 
>socialism, the Party now began to argue, was a struggle that had to be waged in the 
>broader context of a national liberation struggle against a form of colonial 
>oppression. 

The exact nature of the relationship between the socialist and national liberation 
struggles was not necessarily clearly elaborated. At times, the national struggle was 
described as the "form" or "appearance" of the struggle, and the socialist class 
struggle was the "content" or "essence". At other times, the respective demands of the 
two struggles were presented as a "minimum" and a "maximum" programme. But, in time, 
the most common version of the relationship between the struggles was to be the 
"two-stage thesis" - first there would be a national democratic revolution, and a 
subsequent socialist stage would follow. 

While the left in Europe was revising its hopes of any short-term socialist 
revolution, and revisiting its strategic assumptions, here in South Africa the Party 
was also developing, in theory and practice, its own approach to broad, popular front 
politics. South African communists were no longer readying themselves for an imminent 
socialist assault on the bourgeois state in our country. In the South African case, 
the CPSA increasingly located its practice within the context of national liberation 
formations - foremost among them, the ANC. 

In moving strategically in this direction, the South African party was, in many ways, 
exploring an important dimension of Lenin's legacy. Better than many European 
Marxists, Lenin had understood the profound inter-connection between working class 
socialist struggles in the developed capitalist countries and the national struggles 
of colonially oppressed peoples. Lenin was critical of those Marxists who dismissed 
all nationalism as inherently reactionary, he argued that the nationalism of oppressor 
nations and that of oppressed peoples were different realities. 

For the CPSA, in its first decades, "internationalism" meant two important things - 
non-racialism, and the location of the South African struggle within the context of an 
African anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle. The current ANC call for an African 
Renaissance should be located within this longstanding tradition, pioneered, in part, 
by the CPSA. 

But "internationalism" for the Communist Party in South Africa also meant defence of 
the Soviet Union (and later the Soviet bloc). In the context of unceasing capitalist 
hostility and destabilisation efforts directed against the first workers' state by 
imperialist powers, the CPSA's basic position was correct. Later, it was the Soviet 
Union and its bloc in the key decades of the 1960s and 70s, when our liberation 
movement had suffered a serious strategic defeat, that offered unquestioning support 
to our own struggle. South African revolutionaries will never forget this critical 
role. 

However, the degree to which the inevitable twists and turns in the politics of the 
Soviet state impacted upon our own South African programmes is a subject of debate. To 
what extent were our own domestic politics affected, for better or worse, by these 
factors? SACP cadres need to engage in this debate with open minds. 

More seriously, we need to note that our own fundamentally correct solidarity with the 
Soviet Union, often lacked serious balance or nuance. We failed to appreciate, until 
very late, the horrendous levels of criminal abuse that occurred during the Stalin 
years, and we failed to be critical of the bureaucratic distortions in the post-Stalin 
period. We also failed to appreciate, until very late in the day, the levels of 
internal crisis in the former Soviet Union and Soviet bloc. 

Our tardiness in these respects has meant that, in the midst of the otherwise very 
challenging decade of the 1990s, the SACP has had to devote considerable energies and 
time to collectively debating and developing a consistent socialist understanding of 
these questions. The challenge to rescue socialism from the events of 1989-91, and to 
renew socialist confidence and optimism remains an important priority of the SACP. We 
believe that the SACP's internal (but open) debate, and our refusal to give in to 
opportunism of the right (quietly abandoning socialism and our own history), or 
dogmatism of the left (pretending nothing serious had happened) has helped us to lay 
an important foundation to press forward.

4. A Vanguard Party 
In its first years, the CPSA saw itself as a tight-knit vanguard Party that would lead 
a workers' insurrection in South Africa, in response to the deepening world crisis of 
capitalism. In its early years, the Party did not neglect mass work, and indeed many 
of its key cadres were leading members in the labour movement. There was, however, a 
tendency for the Party to set up its own union and national liberation front 
structures. While these played a pioneering role, they were often somewhat inorganic. 

The 1928/9 strategic shift to a national liberation perspective began to force the 
Party to think more profoundly about mass work, and about working with non-communists 
in building existing formations, like the ANC and ICU (the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union). This naturally began to pose questions about how a vanguard party 
works, and indeed, if the Party would be leading the "first stage" of the struggle. 

Unfortunately, the fruitful potential in this strategic shift was not immediately to 
impact fully on the tactics, organisational practices and theory of the Party. The 
strategic shift coincided with a period of heightened internal factionalism. This 
factionalism was partly imported from the Communist International, where Stalinism was 
deepening its grip in a series of bloody factional battles. The distant echo of these 
was felt in the CPSA, often brought by Communist International representatives sent to 
South Africa. But the dangers of a dogmatic vanguardism also became evident in this 
period. Ideological debates within the Party were turned into factional battles for 
bureaucratic control. Leading Party pioneers, among them SP Bunting, were unjustly 
expelled. Many other members left in disillusion. 

It was only in the middle of the 1930s that the CPSA began to recover from this 
unfortunate period. The recovery was helped by the change in Communist International 
strategies towards popular front strategies, and the CPSA was able to fuse the popular 
front approach with its own strategic commitment to a national liberation struggle. 
But the recovery was, especially, the consequence of the new generation of African 
communists, grouped around Moses Kotane, who insisted on a Party that was more rooted 
in its practice and theory in the realities of South Africa itself. In his famous 
"Cradock Letter" of 1934, Kotane wrote to the CPSA's Johannesburg District Party 
Committee: 

"the Party is beyond the realm of realities, we are simply theoretical and our theory 
is less connected with practice. If one investigates the general ideology of our Party 
members (especially the whites), if sincere, he will not fail to see that they 
subordinate South Africa in the interests of Europe, in fact, ideologically they are 
not S Africans...they are 'revolutionaries' and 'Bolsheviks', their hobbies are 'the 
German situation and the comintern, Stalin and Trotsky' and 'the errors of various 
communist parties'. (...) The CPSA must pay special attention to S Africa, study the 
conditions of this country and concretise the demands of the toiling masses from first 
hand information, that we must speak the language of the toiling masses and must know 
their demands. That while it must not lose its international allegiance, the Party 
must be Bolshevised, become South African not only theoretically, but in reality..." 

In the 1940s the CPSA emerged as a powerful political force, possibly more influential 
than the ANC in this period. Its night-school and political education work continued. 
Communists were active in the trade unions and other mass formations. The Party also 
had a significant ideological influence on South African life through the work of 
Party journalists in mass-circulation newspapers. 

The first piece of legislative political repression enacted by the National Party, 
after its election in 1948, was the banning of the Communist Party in 1950. In 1953, 
the Party re-launched clandestinely as the SACP. In the conditions of illegality, the 
meaning attached to being a vanguard Party acquired new siginificance. 

Members were carefully recruited after a period of close probation. Democratic 
centralism was meticulously enforced, and the "need to know" principle applied, 
members only knew as much as was required for their operations, at the relevant level 
of their involvement. In developing these approaches the SACP was able to draw on the 
considerable international Communist experience, especially the war-time resistance 
experience of persecuted Communist parties that had bravely played a vanguard role in 
the anti-fascist struggle. 

When, in 1960 the ANC was banned, and in 1961 when the armed struggle was launched, 
nearly a decade of clandestine SACP experience was to be vital for the survival of the 
broader movement. Nevertheless, the liberation movement as a whole badly miscalculated 
the strength and ruthlessness of the apartheid regime, and by the mid-1960s the 
liberation movement had suffered a serious strategic defeat. 

In exile, in prison, and in the underground, the SACP vanguard strengths were to play 
an absolutely major role in ensuring the survival, regrouping and eventual victory of 
the ANC-led liberation movement. The discipline, the ideological seriousness and 
political education traditions, the internationalism and longer-term vision of the 
Party were decisive factors in ensuring the survival of the national liberation 
movement. 

The SACP's 1962 programme, The Road to South African Freedom, was an especially 
valuable programmatic perspective that was to play a key role within the entire 
liberation movement for the next two and a half decades. It was here that the concept 
of "colonialism of a special type" (CST) received its first sustained and collective 
elaboration. The programme sought to locate the South African struggle within the 
context of a broader continental process ("The African Revolution" was the title of an 
entire chapter). The African decolonisation process was under-way, and the struggles 
of Africa's people's confronted a clear choice - a neo-colonial stagnation, or the 
consolidation and deepening of national democratic transformation. 

The SACP played a major role in the survival of the ANC, but there were other crucial 
factors as well, including the outstanding leadership contribution made by senior ANC 
comrades, among them OR Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. 

The ANC emerged, in 1990, from prison, from exile and from the underground, more 
unified and with more prestige and legitimacy than it had ever enjoyed. The period of 
illegality (30 years) was long, and the dispersal of the ANC across the globe had been 
extreme. Exile, prison, the underground, military camps - none of these are easy 
realities to survive (as the factionalised histories of many other movements forced 
into these circumstances testify). The SACP played a decisive vanguard role in 
fostering the unity and morale of the ANC in this period, and we are proud of this 
achievement. 

The major influence of the SACP upon the ANC in the decades of the 1960s and 70s was 
augmented by the unstinting solidarity of the Soviet Union, and by the world-wide 
advance of communist and communist-aligned liberation movements - China, Korea, Cuba, 
Vietnam, and later Mozambique and Angola. At the Morogoro Conference in 1969, in its 
"Strategy and Tactics" document, the ANC noted that the South African national 
liberation struggle was 

"happening in a new kind of world - a world which is no longer monopolised by the 
imperialist world system; a system in which the existence of the powerful socialist 
system and a significant sector of newly liberated areas has altered the balance of 
forces ..." 

The Morogoro Conference characterised the global conjuncture as one marked by the 
"transition from capitalism to socialism". 

These perspectives are evidence of the extent to which SACP thinking was influencing 
the ANC at the time. But it is also a reminder of how, in this period, the main line 
of historical advance appeared to be moving. This perception was not just a view 
within communist and progressive circles, many leading imperialist ideologues spoke in 
alarm of a ripple of "falling dominoes", as one Third World country after another 
appeared to be moving into the socialist camp. The Party's influence was naturally 
boosted by the mood of the times. 

Ironically, these decades of heightened SACP influence and prestige within the 
liberation movement coincided with a relatively low Party profile, with minimal 
independent SACP organisation, and, perhaps, a neglect of developing independent 
socialist thinking. It is easy to understand the factors at work. In the aftermath of 
the liberation movement's strategic defeat in the mid-1960s, communists worked 
tirelessly and selflessly to rebuild the ANC, MK and to foster a broad, international 
anti-apartheid movement. This practical emphasis was, undoubtedly, correct, but it had 
its own down-side, since it took energies away from the SACP in its own right. 

As far as developing socialist thinking and programmatic perspectives, there was a 
considerable reliance on Soviet political education (which was generously provided), 
but this also meant that there was not a dynamic indigenous development of socialist 
thinking within the Party at this time. Tendencies towards "two stageism" possibly 
also gave reasons to delay any profound elaboration of socialist perspectives. 
However, within the country, on campuses and in the re-emerging trade union movement 
there was a significant and dynamic flowering of left-wing thinking, influenced by an 
international resurgence of progressive ideologies after 1968. Of course, this 
flowering of left-thinking (notably influenced by new left marxisms, and by Black 
Power Afro-American writers) was not without its own illusions, distortions, and 
confusions - but, for its part, the SACP was not always effective or even helpfully 
located in the midst of these progressive developments. 

>From 1985, however, there was a renewed effort from within the Party to build more 
>dynamic SACP underground structures within the country, with a particular emphasis on 
>interacting with the trade union movement. There was also an intensification of 
>ideological debate, and the SACP through its organs (The African Communist and the 
>resurrected Umsebenzi) began now to reflect and impact more dynamically upon left 
>debate and theory in our country. 

All of this constitutes some of the collective heritage that South African communists 
have brought into the challenging and complex 1990s. 

5. Revisiting Marxism-Leninism in the 1990s 
In February 1990, the SACP was unbanned after 40 years of illegality. In nearly 70 
years of unbroken struggle, the SACP was at the height of its popularity. Opinion 
polls within South Africa suggested that, after Nelson Mandela, leading communists 
like Chris Hani and Joe Slovo were amongst the most popular political figures in our 
country. Paradoxically, this domestic popularity for the Party and its key leaders 
coincided in time with the most serious international crisis for the broad Communist 
movement, and its legacy. Economic stagnation, an inability to sustain the Cold War 
arms race, unwieldy bureaucratism, and general popular dissatisfaction led to the 
rapid demise of the old Soviet bloc, and of the Soviet Union itself. 

Cadres within the recently unbanned SACP were faced with three possible options in 
these circumstances - 

to quietly allow membership to lapse (a choice taken in mid-1990 by a siginificant 
percentage of the leadership that had been elected at the 7th Congress the year 
before); 
to pretend that "nothing was wrong", and to cruise along on our struggle-era 
popularity and credentials; or 
to assume responsibility, as the SACP, for our legacy, for its strengths and 
weaknesses, and through discussion and debate, to work for the renewal of the 
socialist project within our country and, indeed, internationally. 
The leadership core around Slovo and Hani, and the SACP's 8th and 9th Congresses (in 
1991 and 1995) decisively chose this last option. This was not the easiest option, but 
it has been endorsed by tens of thousands of SACP members. At the time of its 
unbanning, the SACP's membership was a few thousand strong, much of it in exile. By 
1998, membership had multiplied, with some 80,000 signed up members, of whom around 
14,000 constitute an activist core. 

But to build the SACP as a relevant force for our times has required an ongoing 
collective renewal of our Marxist perspectives. We believe that, in 1998, we have now 
moved sufficiently along the path of this process to be able to enumerate, with a 
sense of collective unity, some of the key ideological features of this renewal. These 
features can be directly related to the key themes we have been using throughout this 
brief overview of the Party's evolving ideological positions - revolution, 
internationalism and the vanguard.

5.1 Revolution and reform 

The split in the international socialist movement in 1915 established the two major 
currents of socialism in this century - the communist and the social democratic. The 
communist current defined itself, at first, as a movement directed strategically at 
the proletarian seizure of bourgeois state power. 

In practice this vision of the transition to socialism never materialised, at least 
not precisely in the form envisaged. In the first place, as we have argued above, the 
revolution in the "West", in the years immediately following 1917, did not take place. 
If anything, in the decades after 1917, the revolution happened in the "East", and 
then, later, in the "South". From China, to Cuba, to Vietnam and Mozambique, it was 
largely peasant armies (often supported by worker struggles), in the context of 
national liberation movements, that waged successful armed struggles. These struggles 
were guided by leadership cores, and in some cases by a Communist Party, drawing on 
the communist tradition. They were not, really, proletarian insurrections in the mould 
of 1917. 

After the defeat of Nazism in Europe in 1944, a series of East European states joined 
the Soviet bloc. Although there had been important left forces in most of these 
countries, the decisive factor here (with the important exception of Yugoslavia) was 
the role of the Soviet Red Army in the defeat of nazism throughout the region. 
However, the sense that socialism had been externally imposed in these countries was 
to be a crucial factor in the demise of this bloc in the 1989-91 period. 

Looking back over the seventy year history of this Soviet-inspired project to build 
socialism, it is clear that it was only really successful (and partially at that) in 
underdeveloped societies, most emerging from colonial or neo-colonial oppression. The 
socialist path was, in many respects, a partial de-linking (sometimes actively chosen, 
often imposed) from the imperialist system. This de-linking created space for 
underdeveloped societies to make significant developmental gains, to advance a 
national and democratic project, and (in countries like Cuba, for instance) to make 
genuine and major advances in socialising the economy and society in general. The 
sheer size of the Soviet Union, its vast physical resources and massive internal 
market, and later the similar assets of the Peoples Republic of China, allowed this 
partial de-linking to be sustained for some decades. The existence of a socialist bloc 
(not without its own many internal contradictions), in turn, allowed small!
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er and otherwise isolated societies (like Cuba) to pursue similar paths of 
development. 

We believe that the era of "socialism in one bloc" is over, and perhaps was never a 
longer term sustainable strategy. While partial and active de-linking from the global 
imperialist system is still absolutely essential, a project of socialist isolationism, 
of "fortress socialism", will only end in imprisoning the very people on behalf of 
whom the socialism is supposed to be consolidated. In the remaining societies of what 
we once called "actually existing socialism", societies in which important elements of 
socialism remain intact, (like Cuba, the PRC, and Vietnam, for instance), there are 
clearly major debates and uncertainties. But all progressive forces in these countries 
accept the necessity of engaging with the capitalist system. Socialist gains have to 
be defended and taken forward on the terrain of a capitalist dominated world, and not 
in some "other world", some "other time zone", behind a "wall". 

But it is not just the defence of socialism that requires an active engagement on the 
terrain of capitalism itself. In societies like South Africa socialism will have to be 
built in a country, a region and a world dominated by capitalism. 

This basic statement compels us to revisit any simplistic opposition of "revolution" 
and "reform". In a sense, as we have been arguing above, the communist movement has 
been revisiting this simple opposition since the late 1920s - but the time has come to 
now do this more consciously, and explicitly. 

The 1915 split between communist and social democratic parties, and the subsequent 
history of this split, established an often very crude set of contrasts. Communists 
were supposedly revolutionary insurrectionists, social democrats were pursuing "the 
parliamentary road". The vast historical struggle for a socialist transformation was 
often reduced to a debate on how best the "decisive break-through" should be made 
(insurrection or elections?), an "event" became the key defining feature of different 
socialist currents. Of course, this is a very crude interpretation of the politics and 
programmes of actual communist and social democratic parties, but we still hear voices 
arguing as if there were two simplistic and contrasting options. 

The struggle for socialism is a vast, historical struggle to shift the balance of 
class forces towards working people and other popular forces. This struggle has not 
been, and will not be, a simple evolutionary development, guaranteed by history. 
Taking place on the terrain of a world dominated by capitalism, it is marked by 
unevenness, by moments of stagnation, by advances, ruptures, by reverses, and, no 
doubt, by decisive moments. To understand this struggle as a simple contrast between 
revolution and reform is not helpful. 

Revolutions that seize commanding heights, and which install new ruling elites that 
force-march their societies into "modernisation" and "development", using 
managerialist techniques that are little different (and sometimes much harsher) than 
those in capitalist production, are bound to fail the socialist project. Seizing 
commanding heights, transferring power, without transforming the nature and 
institutionalisation of power, will not advance socialism in any sustainable way. 

Struggles to reform power relations, including capitalist production relations, are 
not mere "dress rehearsals" for the "real thing" that will come sooner or later (a 
seizure of power). Intensive structural reforms must precede and must follow any 
decisive democratic or, indeed, socialist break-through. Such a break-through may come 
through armed insurrection, negotiation, elections, sustained mass pressure, as the 
relatively successful outcome of a civil war, or a war of national liberation, or, as 
in the case of South Africa's breakthrough in 1994, a partial combination of all of 
the above. 

By contrast, reform for reform's sake is also not a viable socialist strategy. Reforms 
that are unstrategic, that lack a transformational agenda, that serve to legitimise 
and entrench capitalism (or gender or race oppression), and which transform working 
class and popular forces into grateful spectators are, bluntly, unacceptably 
"reformist". 

5.2 A mass-driven transformation process 

There is another powerful struggle tradition within our country that has influenced 
our Party, and to which, in turn, our Party has made an important contribution. It is 
also a tradition that challenges notions of a simple opposition between reform and 
revolution. The tradition was born, partly, out of the defiance strategies pioneered 
by Mahatma Gandhi here in South Africa in the early part of the century, and then 
applied on a vast scale in the Indian national liberation struggle. 

Soon after Indian independence, Dr Yusuf Dadoo, later to become SACP general 
secretary, visited Gandhi in India, reflecting a personal admiration but also an 
understanding that important lessons were to be garnered from the Indian struggle. 

In 1946 the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses revived Gandhi's passive resistance 
strategies here in South Africa, leading defiance struggles against the Ghetto Act. 
The inspiring example of these campaigns had, in turn, a direct impact upon the 
revival of the ANC in the early 1950s, notably with the 1952 Defiance Campaign, which 
marked the beginning of a mass-line within the ANC and its broader Congress Movement. 
The traditions of the Defiance Campaign were carried forward in the 1950s and early 
60s, in consumer boycotts, bus boycotts, pass burnings, the boycott (and destruction) 
of municipal beer-halls, and mass national political stay-aways. 

The significance of these strategies needs to be located, in part, within the context 
of a struggle against colonial (or special colonial) rule. In the first place, many of 
these actions seek to embarrass and render unworkable the exclusion and simultaneous 
inferior inclusion of nationally oppressed peoples, by way of mass defiance of 
colonial regulations that deprive the nationally oppressed of basic citizenship 
rights. In the second place, these actions often depend for their success on using the 
very exclusion of racially oppressed peoples (into ghettoes, townships, bush colleges 
and gutter education schools, and rural reserves) as a weapon to boycott their 
inferior inclusion as workers (the stay-at-home), as consumers (the boycott of 
potatoes, or tobacco, or white shops), as students (class boycotts), and as commuters 
(bus boycotts). 

More generally, these strategies are also based on the experience of many progressive 
anti-colonial struggles, in which independence has been won, not as a result of the 
revolutionary defeat of the colonial power's metropolitan state apparatus, but more by 
rendering continued colonial rule too costly. This escalation of cost to the 
metropolitan power has been the product of diverse factors - including wasting armed 
struggles in distant places, mass defiance, or a revolution (precipitated in large 
measure by distant liberation struggles) in the metropolitan power centre itself (as 
in Portugal in April 1974). Characteristically in the 20th century, progressive 
national liberation struggles have won independence through protracted struggle that 
has culminated, not in an insurrectionary overthrow, but in negotiations. 

In South Africa, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the mass defiance strategy was revived, 
in circumstances which highlight one other important feature of this tradition. 
Colonial (and in our case, special colonial) rule relies on a variety of subordinate 
state apparatuses to administer and control colonial subjects. There was considerable 
racist inventiveness in South Africa over the 20th century in the elaboration of these 
subordinate apparatuses - the reinvention of chieftaincy, "independent" bantustans, 
black local authorities and, towards the end, there was even a "tri-racial 
parliament". 

It is often said by the cynical that the ANC-led liberation movement failed to 
overthrow the apartheid regime. This is true, of course, but the cynics fail to 
appreciate that the democratic breakthrough of 1994 was won, primarily, because of the 
strategic political defeat of apartheid. At the heart of this strategic defeat was the 
fact that millions of South Africans had rendered the subordinate state apparatuses 
(bantustans, the tricameral parliament, the black local authorities, inferior 
education) illegitimate and unworkable. Cynics also scoff at the slogan of 
"ungovernability" or bewail that it is the cause of present woes. In fact, 
ungovernability was a profoundly correct strategy of the anti-apartheid struggle, and 
it was directed at defying the special colonial apparatuses that oppressed the 
majority. 

In the period 1990-1994, the traditions of mass mobilisation and the defiance of 
illegitimate authority were a critical factor in transforming the balance of forces in 
the negotiations process. 

A simplistic dichotomy between revolution and reform would be unable to classify these 
mass traditions, let alone clarify them. As the SACP, we draw on this long tradition 
within our country to affirm our belief that the struggle for a socialist transition 
is not about a simple choice of reform or revolution, but a challenge to combine 
reform and revolution in a sustained mass-based transformational struggle. 

For the SACP, the challenge in the present is to sustain a struggle for 
"revolutionary-reforms" - these are reforms that are not isolated improvements, but 
which attack the core of capitalist (race and gender) power, which have a 
transformational capacity, which use the new possibilities of state and legislative 
power, which build up organisational mass momentum, keeping the capitalist ruling bloc 
off-balance, and increasingly empower working class and popular forces as their own 
emancipators. 

Revisiting the reform-revolution opposition also compels a review of what we now 
understand by internationalism. 

5.3 Internationalism in the new millennium 

The Communist International critique of social democracy was certainly not without 
foundation. Social democratic leaderships that sided with their respective 
bourgeoisies in the First World War were often, objectively, seeking to protect 
privileges that had been possible in the context of a colonial and imperialist 
division of global power and spoils. They often represented the interests of a "labour 
aristocracy". The evolution of the Labour Party in South Africa illustrates this 
reality in an extreme form - born from the white working class labour movement, the 
party aligned itself with the racist National Party in the 1920s, in defence of 
"civilised standards" for white workers, and then disappeared altogether, with its 
project swallowed up in apartheid white welfarism. 

As we have noted in the first chapter of this programme, in the post-1945 period, 
important gains were scored by the working class in many developed economies, under 
the political leadership of social democratic parties. In the left of these parties, 
the vision of a more substantial socialist transformation was advanced, but, 
generally, the gains won improved the conditions of working people, but failed to 
progressively weaken capitalism. With the change in global economic conditions in the 
early 1970s, because class realities had not been substantially transformed, there was 
a resurgent capitalist offensive in these societies against welfare gains, and against 
organised working class forces. 

In the developed countries, these processes have led to a variety of tendencies within 
the old social democratic formations - on the one hand, a narrowing focus on 
elections, a continued drift towards the centre, and attempts to weaken the social 
weight of organised labour on the electoral party machinery. This centre-wards trend 
is not going unchallenged, however, in these societies. Struggles to defend welfare 
gains, trade union rights, and to advance innovative strategies, like the demand for a 
35-hour working week, are being taken up actively. 

In the conditions of growing globalisation, working class and other progressive forces 
in these societies are also more inclined to work in solidarity with progressive 
forces in the South. The major imperialist corporations operate transnationally, it is 
no longer possible for German workers, for instance, to defend their gains in 
Volkswagen plants, independently of close solidarity with workers in Brazil, Mexico 
and South Africa. Old Cold War divisions have abated, especially in the international 
labour movement. These are realities of strategic re-definition and realignment in 
which our ally COSATU is playing an important international role. But they also have 
implications for the SACP and ANC. 

The changing realities of capitalism, especially in the most developed capitalist 
economies, have also produced the social conditions in which a wide range of new, 
generally progressive, social movements have emerged - international solidarity, 
anti-racist and human rights groups of all kinds, ecological movements, peace 
movements and gender rights groups. Many of these groups played an outstanding role in 
the international anti-apartheid struggle. Partly born out of this practical 
experience, the SACP's own understanding of "internationalism" and of 
"internationalist work" has developed considerably. The need for, and the 
possibilities of wide-ranging, multi-lateral international relations with a broad 
network of formations, many of which are not self-declared communist or socialist 
forces, is obvious. 

5.4 A vanguard Party for the present and the future 

The question of the character of the Party confronted the SACP directly and quite 
dramatically in the 1990s, and the issue was debated extensively at our 8th and 9th 
Congresses. Emerging out of 40 years of illegality, with a small, tightly-knit 
cadreship, we were suddenly presented with new organisational challenges and 
possibilities. 

It was clear to the Party that the organisational priority, once more, was not the 
building of the SACP, but of the ANC - to ensure that it was massive, rooted among the 
popular masses organisationally, and that it developed progressive policies and a 
capacity to negotiate effectively, win elections and govern. Once more, leading Party 
cadres, at all levels, devoted themselves (along with many non-communists) to this 
critical organisational priority. 

But what of the Party itself? What organisational form, in the first place, should it 
assume? Many comrades argued that the Party should retain a tight, "vanguard" 
character, that there should be careful selectivity in recruitment, that the Party 
should seek to be well organised and ideologically advanced, influential through the 
clarity and quality of its cadres, rather than through the size of its membership. 
Given the strategic organisational priority of rebuilding the ANC, given the 
limitation of resources in the Party, and given our own decades of underground 
discipline, there was much that was attractive in this position. 

However, there were also obvious problems. The first half of the 1990s were, 
necessarily, a period of considerable ideological fluidity in and around the Party, 
and a significant number of comrades from the central committee elected in 1989 had 
allowed their membership to lapse. If membership were to be based on a closely 
supervised period of probation, who was to do the supervising? And around what 
stabilised ideological framework was this probation to be conducted? In the fluidity 
of the period, the danger that probation and tight recruiting would become 
factionalised was obvious. 

What is more, in the early 1990s there was an overwhelming demand for Party membership 
from tens of thousands of comrades. Many were seasoned revolutionaries from the trade 
union movement, from the mass democratic movement and from the underground ANC - they 
had been unable to connect effectively with our clandestine structures in the 
preceding decades, but many had conducted pro-SACP work in their organisations 
notwithstanding. They were ready, willing and perfectly capable of making a major 
contribution to rebuilding the SACP and advancing the socialist project. 

At the 1991 8th Congress, the SACP resolved to build itself as a "mass vanguard" 
party. For those who like metaphysical elegance this may have seemed like a 
contradiction in terms, but it was, broadly, the correct decision. The Congress 
distinguished the role of the Party (which was to remain that of a socialist vanguard 
within the context of a broader liberation movement), and the organisational character 
of the Party (which was now to be more mass-based). This resolution pointed the Party 
in the right direction. The Party benefited enormously from the influx of thousands of 
outstanding new cadres, and generally the Party succeeded in welding together the 
different streams of our movement (exile, underground, mass democratic movement and 
prison) than our alliance partner, the ANC. Being an effective and developed communist 
cadre was now seen less as an entry requirement, and more as something that, 
collectively, the Party should help you to become. This general orientation wa!
!
!
s correct, which is not to say that the SACP has yet adequately stabilised effective 
organisational structures. 

The precise organisational role, and therefore the size of Party we are seeking to 
build remain the subject of debate in our Party, but we have, in the course of this 
decade built a substantial Party organisation, and accumulated real organisational 
experience that has moved us beyond the parameters of the debates of the early 1990s. 

6. Taking theory seriously 
One matter on which we are collectively clear is that a key aspect of the SACP's 
vanguard role lies in the domain of ideological work - of taking theory seriously, of 
ensuring continuous political education and strategic debate within our Party and in 
our broader movement, of engaging the broader public debate with consistent 
anti-capitalist, socialist perspectives. In this respect, we are obviously building on 
long Party traditions in South Africa - the traditions of night-schools, of cadre 
development, of independent Party publications, and of progressive journalism. 

Theory, we have always affirmed is not dogma, it needs to continuously inform and be 
informed by collective, organised revolutionary practice. In the course of the 1990s, 
the SACP has begun to broaden its Marxism in several significant ways, in particular 
we should high-light: 

6.1 The limitations of "productivism" - a blindness to gender oppression 

Marxism developed on the foundations (and as a critique) of classical bourgeois 
economics. In its heyday, before capitalism was dominated by a parasitic financial 
sector, bourgeois economics focused upon production and, therefore, on labour. It was 
this focus that was central to Marxism as well. The focus was not wrong, but it led to 
a tendency to down-play the critical reproductive side of economies, and societies at 
large. 

This theoretical tendency was reinforced by the sociology of communist and socialist 
parties, emerging as they often did from the largely blue-collar, male, labour 
movements of the turn of the century. 

The focus on production obscured the central economic and social role played by 
"non-economic" activity in the reproduction of society - the rearing of children, 
caring for the sick and elderly, house-hold management, and shopping. Much of this 
work is borne by women, and the failure to adequately account for it has led to an 
historical blindness around gender oppression in many socialist and communist 
formations. Insofar as programmatic solutions were offered for overcoming gender 
oppression, they tended themselves to be "productivist" solutions: by drawing women 
into productive, waged-labour they would be liberated from the prison of their homes. 
In practice, while women have been partially liberated by being wage-earners in their 
own right, they have also typically had to carry a double burden - formal waged labour 
during the day, and informal, unpaid reproductive labour before and after that. 

The SACP believes that a key task in taking forward, developing and renewing the 
socialist project requires a much greater theoretical and practical attention to 
reproductive labour, and it is here that much of the intersection between class and 
gender oppression is to be found. 

6.2 Neglect of environmental sustainability 

"Productivist" exaggerations have also led to a neglect of environmental 
sustainability. In former socialist countries, like the Soviet Union, the construction 
of socialism was often conceptualised in very technocratic and managerialist terms, as 
a forced-march into modernisation. Socialism was about "catching up" with the West in 
terms of physical outputs (tons of steel, coal or wheat, kilojoules of electricity). 
Scant attention was paid to environmental sustainability (another key dimension of the 
reproduction of economies and societies). 

The critique of an exaggerated "productivism" needs also to be carried forward, in 
theory and practice, by the SACP on the front of struggle for a safe, people-friendly 
and sustainable environment. 

6.3 What is theory? 

When we write or speak about our practical experience as the SACP we are proud of 
referring to our own indigenous experience. But when we speak about theory, our 
reference points tend to be the "classics" of socialism - Marx, Engels and Lenin. 
There is no doubt about the outstanding contribution each of these have made to 
socialism - but is communist theory something only associated with outstanding 
(usually male) revolutionaries from Europe whose "Collected Works" fill a library 
shelf? In celebrating, in reading and debating Marx, Engels and Lenin, have we 
contributed, unwittingly, to a particular image of what being a communist means? 

In the struggle for the renewal of the socialist project, the SACP must expose its 
membership and the broader mass movement to the widest range of progressive writings 
and theory - including to those who were often suppressed because they were considered 
"dissident" - Bukharin, Trostky, Rosa Luxemburg. 

We need, also, to acknowledge our indebtedness to a wide range of Third World 
revolutionary theorists - among them Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Mao Tse Tung, Ernesto "Che" 
Guevara, Fidel Castro, and many more. 

We need to understand and popularise the contribution made by outstanding African 
revolutionaries - like Amilcar Cabral and Agostino Neto - and theorists like Samir 
Amin. Moreover, we need to understand the contribution made to our own Party's theory 
and practice by many African revolutionaries, who were not necessarily from within the 
traditions of Marxism-Leninism - Julius Nyerere, Frantz Fanon, and many others. Our 
movement and our Party have also been influenced by generations of revolutionary and 
progressive Afro-Americans. 

Above all, we need to broaden our understanding of revolutionary theory so that we 
have a much better grasp of the contribution made to the SACP's ideological positions 
by thousands of South Africans - from the early revolutionary pioneers, David Ivon 
Jones, SP Bunting, Albert Nzula, Eddie Roux, through Moses Kotane, JB Marks, Jack and 
Ray Simons, Govan Mbeki, Yusuf Dadoo, Bram Fischer, Alex La Guma, MP Naicker, Mick 
Harmel to Duma Nokwe, Ruth First and Joe Slovo, Comrade Mzala, Matthew Goniwe and 
Chris Hani. Some have left us with fairly extensive theoretical writings, often 
published in other MK names, or in the shape of collective documents, or in training 
manuals. Others, like Hani, made their theoretical contribution in hundreds of 
unrecorded speeches. The SACP also needs to appreciate the degree to which our 
theoretical positions have been influenced by many generations of outstanding, 
non-communist revolutionaries in our broader liberation movement - among them OR Tambo!
!
!
 

In seeking to do justice to our SACP theoretical legacy, we have to move even beyond 
this. In a society like our own, where there are extremely high levels of illiteracy, 
in which there are now eleven different official languages, and in which, on the other 
hand, there are powerful traditions of oral culture (speech-making, funeral orations, 
song, poetry, and just plain umrabulo) it is critical that we do not over-privilege 
one form of theorising (in a book, written in a global language like English) and 
marginalise knowledge, theory, debate and learning that happen in other ways. 

If we broaden our understanding of theory, debate and learning, we will better be able 
to appreciate how a shack-dwelling activist like Dora Tamana pioneered in the 1950s a 
socialist co-operative movement for child-care and food distribution, guided by her 
own township experiences and inspired by a brief visit to the Soviet Union. Tamana 
made a major contribution to our collective understanding, but you will not find it in 
any book written by her. Yet she recounted this experience in many forums, and helped 
to inspire the relaunching of mass democratic movement structures in the 1980s. 

We are advancing these views not in opposition to formal learning, or to denigrate the 
importance of books and publications, still less because we espouse some demagogic 
anti-theoretical stance. The SACP takes theory very seriously, it is precisely because 
we do so, that we find it important to elaborate our understanding of what theory is. 

The SACP is not ashamed to call itself Marxist-Leninist, but then we are also Moses 
Kotaneists and Dora Tamanists. 

6.4 Breaking with dogma 

Linked to all of the above is the need to break out of the bureaucratic grip of dogma. 
The institutionalisation of socialism in the Soviet Union in the Stalin years 
established a tradition of Marxism-Leninism that sought to be all-embracing, total. 
Marxism-Leninism became a "science" of everything, from agronomy to class struggle, 
from art theory and psychology to the "universal laws of motion". The actual Marx and 
Lenin had struggled fiercely against "metaphysics" and "speculative philosophy", and 
yet this is what often came to be enshrined as Marxism-Leninism. 

If Marxism-Leninism was to be all-embracing, then it followed that theories, sciences, 
aesthetic approaches, ethical and world-views that differed from those that were 
formally endorsed were necessarily "antagonistic" and "reactionary". This had many 
dire and negative consequences. 

One obvious area was in the relationship between communism and religion. Instead of 
approaching the social reality of religious belief with an historical, class and 
dialectical understanding, communists tended to approach religion metaphysically - it 
was seen mechanically and dogmatically as a "rival" belief system to be defeated at 
all costs. In practice, in the SACP, there have always been comrades of religious 
persuasion (including many religious ministers), but their involvement has tended to 
be seen as an anomaly. The truth, however, is that these comrades were attracted to 
our Party not despite their religious beliefs - but because of them. And it is because 
of their religious views that many were, and are, outstanding communists. Sadly, many 
thousands of other South Africans have been attracted by the moral and political 
message of communism, only to feel excluded by the "atheism" of our Party. 

The SACP reaffirms its commitment to the right of anyone to hold (or not to hold) 
religious beliefs. The SACP is not defined by being either a Party of atheists or 
believers. This is a matter of principle, and not opportunism. Our class approach to 
reality (a bias towards the poor), our struggle for a society based on social need and 
not on private profit, our condemnation of selfishness, and personal greed, and our 
refusal to give way to demoralisation (in other words, our espousing of hope) are 
closer to the core values of all of the world's major religions than the ethos of 
globalisation, imperialism and the Johannesburg Stock Market. Dogmatic errors from the 
side of Marxists, and the class abuse of institutionalised religion by many 
reactionary forces, have historically contributed to a dichotomy between socialists 
and believers that should never have happened. 

In struggling, as communists, against the strangle-hold of dogma, we are reaffirming 
that our theory is dynamic, living and engaged with collective practice. The renewal 
of the socialist project requires an understanding that there is no single way of 
"being a communist". There are a thousand ways of being a communist, and some of those 
ways would not even admit to the name "communist". 

150 years ago, Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, called on communists not to 
see themselves as a breed apart, as a sect removed from society, and especially not 
from the broader working class movement as a whole. Communists, they declared: 

"have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. They 
do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the 
proletarian movement. The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class 
parties by this only: (1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of different 
countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire 
proletariat, independently of all nationality. (2) In the various stages of the 
development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to 
pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a 
whole." 

As South African communists, members of a Party that has been in the midst of working 
class and popular struggles stretching over three-quarters of a century, we draw 
strength from this vision of the role of communists. It is a vision that we believe 
has been exemplified, developed and enriched in our own struggle traditions. 




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