At 02:12 PM 6/22/2005 +0200, Victor wrote:
Hegel regards objectification as simply the alienation of spirit in the
object. The ideal itself is the alienated spirit that has become a
universal through the mediation of language. True, I've not addressed the
problem of whether Hegel regarded labour activity (transformation of the
ideal as consciousness joined with language forms by its expression in
labour activity) but if I recall correctly he does not really concern
himself with this problem. The question of the effect, if any, of labour
activity on the ideal certainly does not appear in the Logic. Marx in his
1844 Critique of Hegelian Philosophy takes Hegel to task for regarding the
nature that becomes the subject of logos as the abstracted nature of
theory rather than the material nature external to intellect. It is
however an interesting question, and I would appreciate any additional
information on this. Meanwhile I'll do some investigation on my own.
I can't help you answer my question, but it _is_ the question (Hegel's
specific view of labor activity) which you did not clearly address in your
exposition.
In respect to the relation between reason and nature for sure (see above).
While it is true that the laws and principles that govern material
practice directed towards the realization of the objectives of labour
activity are abstract theoretical representations they or at least their
application are subject to the test of nature which is not dependent
solely on human knowledge but also involves phenomena that is entirely
indifferent to the intellectual creations of men.
How does this differ from Hegel's view? Hegel as an inheritor of idealist
tradition would not express himself this way, but presumably he has a way
of accounting for the testing of our subjective notions about nature.
Thus theory, even natural science theory, can never precisely describe
actual labour activity if only because the natural conditions confronting
labour are in a constant state of change. Thus the natural laws or
application of natural laws incorporated into the design of any given
labour activity will never be exactly those encountered in the course of
actual labour activity.
This is what bugs me about your conception of scientific theory, which is
not about labor activity. I don't like this way of expressing things.
This, by the way, is how Lenin regards Engels theory of freedom and
necessity in human activity.
"Secondly, Engels does not attempt to contrive "definitions" of freedom
and necessity, the kind of scholastic definition with which the
reactionary professors (like Avenarius) and their disciples (like
Bogdanov) are most concerned. Engels takes the knowledge and will of man,
on the one hand, and the necessity of nature, on the other, and instead of
giving definitions, simply says that the necessity of nature is primary,
and human will and mind secondary. The latter must necessarily and
inevitably adapt themselves to the former. Engels regards this as so
obvious that he does not waste words explaining his view. It needs the
Russian Machians to complain of Engels' general definition of materialism
(that nature is primary and mind secondary; remember Bogdanov's
"perplexity" on this point!), and at the same time to regard one of the
particular applications by Engels of this general and fundamental
definition as "wonderful" and "remarkably apt"!
Thirdly, Engels does not doubt the existence of "blind necessity." He
admits the existence of a necessity unknown to man. This is quite obvious
from the passage just quoted. But how, from the standpoint of the
Machians, can man know of the existence of what he does not know? Is it
not "mysticism," "metaphysics," the admission of "fetishes" and "idols,"
is it not the "Kantian unknowable thing-in-itself" to say that we know of
the existence of an unknown necessity? Had the Machians given the matter
any thought they could not have failed to observe the complete identity
between Engels' argument on the knowability of the objective nature of
things and on the transformation of "things-in-themselves" into
"things-for-us," on the one hand, and his argument on a blind, unknown
necessity, on the other. The development of con-sciousness in each human
individual and the development of the collective knowledge of humanity at
large presents us at every step with examples of the transformation of the
unknown "thing-in-itself" into the known "thing-for-us," of the
transformation of blind, unknown necessity, "necessity-in-itself," into
the known "necessity-for-us." Epistemologically, there is no difference
whatever between these two transformations, for the basic point of view in
both cases is the same, viz., materialistic, the recognition of the
objective reality of the external world and of the laws of external
nature, and of the fact that this world and these laws are fully knowable
to man but can never be known to him with finality. We do not know the
necessity of nature in the phenomena of the weather, and to that extent we
are inevitably slaves of the weather. But while we do not know this
necessity, we do know that it exists. Whence this knowledge? From the very
source whence comes the knowledge that things exist outside our mind and
independently of it, namely, from the development of our knowledge, which
provides millions of examples to every individual of knowledge replacing
ignorance when an object acts upon our sense-organs, and conversely of
ignorance replacing knowledge when the possibility of such action is
eliminated. (Lenin (1908) Materialism and Emperio-Criticism Chapter 6)
This is remarkably objectivistic of you, given the thrust of your arguments
to date.
By the way I've one reservation concerning Lenin (and Engels) view
regarding the issue of natural laws. They appear to argue, correct me if
I'm wrong, that the natural law to which men must conform is that which is
universal to all nature. I would argue that we do not and cannot know the
laws universal to nature, but only the particular manifestation of natural
law as it pertains to human labour activity and that these are not identical.
I don't like this formulation. (Reminds me of Popper in a weird way.) I
suggest that your last sentence is a non sequitur, and the phrase 'human
labour activity' is out of place. We've known since Hume that we can't
prove any of our knowledge claims definitively, and all philosophers of
science subscribe to some form of fallibilism. However, it is an arbitrary
supposition that our knowledge claims cannot pertain to universal natural
laws, which is what he most powerful scientific claims purport to
do. Furthermore, your assertion contradicts your whole argument about Engels.
That is, natural laws regarding human interaction with nature are
universal only as regards the labour activity of all men in nature.
This is an obscurantist formulation of the egocentric predicament, with
that objectionable phrase 'labor activity'.
To argue otherwise departs from the essentially activist paradigm of Hegel
and Marx and describes human knowledge of nature as that of an essentially
disinterested being contemplating nature free of the restrictions of his
own properties and interests.
Non sequitur and false assumption. I don't like this at all.
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