On Thu, 2 Mar 2006 02:22:29 -0000 "rosa lichtenstein" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Jim, > > Thanks for that; however, while I recognise that others have said > somewhat > similar things, I do not think you have shown that the ones you list > argue > the way I do. > > Hook does not pose this dilemma, as far as I am aware. If you give > me the > page reference, I will check. If it is the same, as I said, I will > be > gob-smacked.
What I was thinking of was chapter 9, "Dialectic and Nature," in *Reason, Social Myth and Democracy* (Prometheus Books, 1991), in particular the discussion that appears from pages 206-210. Hook's argument, to be sure, is not identical with your argument, but like you, Hook makes the point that when we have contradictions appearing within or between scientific theories, the scientist attempts to discover ways for resolving or eliminating these contradictions rather than just blandly accepting their existence on the grounds that reality is contradictory. > > I share with Cohen only an antipathy toward Hegel; his attempt to do > > analytic Marxism I reject because it wasn't analytic enough (by a > long way), > and scarcely Marxist. However, I greatly admired his attempt to > bring > clarity to historical materialism. It's a pity his detractors failed > to copy > his here, and quickly returned to the Hegelian mire. > > I was aware of Neurath, but my take on this is not the same as his > (as you > will soon see if you look at my summary of Essay Twelve -- the full > Essay > will appear much later). I do not accept Neurath's criterion of > meaning, > since I am not a positivist, logical or otherwise. But that is not > the only > difference. > > And I was also aware that I am not the first anti-Hegelian Marxist > (!!); my > criticisms of Hegel bear no relation to dela Volpe (or Colletti, > or....). > > Some of my most original material you will find here: > > http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm > > and here: > > http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2005.htm > > Even though my ideas are dependent on Frege and Wittgenstein, I > apply them > to these areas of DM in a totally new way. > > Where else will you find a neo-Fregean/Wittgensteinian dissolution > of (but > not solution to) Zeno's paradox, for example? Or someone who shows > exactly > how Hegel's confusion of the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of > identity > is the heart of this dialectical beast? > > To be sure this is Bertrand Russell's point, but here I share about > 1% with > him. > > In Essays Three and Twelve I reveal how this confusion arose in > ancient > Greece and why leisure-dominated Greek thinkers imagined the world > could be > understood by an appeal to abstractions (and thus how super-truths > could be > derived from language alone), and how they created these > abstractions by a > syntactically inept interpretation of a superficial feature of > Indo-European > grammar, and how this destroys the capacity language has for > expressing > generality, thus undermining DM itself. DM thus becomes its own > grave-digger; a nice dialectical inversion, this. > > [Re Indo-European grammar, Nietzsche had a somewhat similar idea, > but I push > it much further, and back it up with a totally new analysis.] > > Of course, I could be 100% wrong in all I say, but I defy you to > find where > else this stuff can be found. > > However I am holding back the vast bulk of the original material for > my PhD > thesis (for obvious reasons). > > RL > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Jim Farmelant" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu> > Sent: Thursday, March 02, 2006 1:42 AM > Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] People's History of Science > > > > > > > > On Wed, 1 Mar 2006 13:27:34 -0000 "Rosa Lichtenstein" > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >> Charles, thanks for those comments. > >> > >> I absolutely agree, much anti-dialectic stuff is hackneyed to > high > >> heaven. > >> > >> As to my claim that my ideas are largely original to me, you will > >> have to > >> check for yourself. What can I say...? > >> > >> "You know. Like that Lenin is using a metaphysical concept when > he > >> analyzes > >> "John is a man." That's not exactly a new criticism." > >> > >> Ah, but if you check the line I take, you will see I do develop > it > >> in new > >> ways (along neo-Fregean lines -- if you know of anyone else who > has > >> done > >> this, I will be gob-smacked!). And where have you come across > this > >> before > >> (posted at Revolutionary Left a few weeks ago)? > > > > I think some other people have attempted similar things in > > the past. You, yourself alluded to Gerald Cohen with his > > *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*. > > Concerning your treatment of the Dialectician's Dilemma, didn't > > Sidney Hook advance a similar line of argument in his book, > > *Reason, Social Myths and Democracy*? And Hook was > > insistent that diamat, while being formally atheist, would > > up smuggling Hegel's God into its concept of matter. > > And Otto Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, > likewise > > made the equation of metaphysics with ideology long ago. > > Neurath believed that it was possible to ground Marxism without > > appealing to any sort of qausi-Hegelian metaphysics, which > > he rejected as being literally nonsensical and meaningless. > > > > In Italy, the Communist philosopher, Galvano della Volpe > > in writings like his *Logic as a Positive Science* took a > > strongly anti-Hegelian stance, rejecting the Hegelianized > > Marxism that had been handed down in Italy by Gramsci, > > who had been profoundly influenced by Croce and Gentile. > > Della Volpe in his writings talked of dialectics but his > > treatment of the subject drew upon such thinkers as > > John Dewey, David Hume, and even Rudolf Carnap > > > >> > >> "Comrades might like to think about this (taken from my site): > >> > >> The quandary facing dialecticians we might call the > "Dialecticians' > >> Dilemma" > >> [DD]. The DD arises from the uncontroversial observation that if > >> reality is > >> fundamentally contradictory then any true theory should reflect > this > >> > >> supposed state of affairs. However, and this is the problem, in > >> order to do > >> this such a theory must contain contradictions itself or it would > >> not be an > >> accurate reflection of nature. But, if the development of science > is > >> > >> predicated either on the removal of contradictions from theories, > or > >> on the > >> replacement of older theories with less contradictory ones, as > >> DM-theorists > >> contend, then science could not advance toward a 'truer' account > of > >> the > >> world. This is because scientific theories would then reflect > >> reality less > >> accurately, having had all (or most) of their contradictions > >> removed. > >> > >> [DM = Dialectical Materialism.] > >> > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
