Also worth of consideration are Piaget's discussions on the philosophy of science (especially its turn to 'sociology of knowledge' post-Kuhn). This article (which I managed to get online for free somewhere, but I can now only find the abstract for) has been influential in pushing forward a consideration of Piaget in philosophy of science, under the sub-topic of epistemology and more specifically 'constructivist epistemology'. Apparently Piaget had extensive correspondence with Kuhn (I certainly never learned this when Kuhn was taught to me in philosophy of science back in the 80s), and some late positions of Popper's (after the interaction with Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend) resulted in work that is remarkably parallel to Piaget's. But in the philosophy of science, later Popper is mostly ignored.
One last aside here, Feyerabend would have been the most politically left of these prominent academic philosophers of science (Piaget wasn't a professional philosopher in an American sense), and his approach to philosophy of science is often seen as having gone off the deep end towards irrational skepticism. I don't think so, but inductive Big Science and academic philosophy of science are conservative establishment endeavours, and few people as individuals can escape the demands of sponsorship. http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/16/2/203 Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science Piaget vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress Jonathan Y. Tsou University of Chicago This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of 'scientific progress', which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas Kuhn's (1922–1996). Issues of scientific continuity, scientific realism and scientific rationality are discussed. It is argued that Piaget's view highlights weaknesses in Kuhn's 'discontinuous' picture of scientific change. Key Words: evolutionary epistemology • Kuhn • philosophy of science • Piaget • scientific progress • structural realism _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
